Consumer-Driven Operations: Empirical and Experimental Studies in Demand Models by Kim, Dayoung
CONSUMER-DRIVEN OPERATIONS: EMPIRICAL
AND EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES IN DEMAND
MODELS
A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
by
Dayoung Kim
August 2017
c© 2017 Dayoung Kim
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
CONSUMER-DRIVEN OPERATIONS: EMPIRICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL
STUDIES IN DEMAND MODELS
Dayoung Kim, Ph.D.
Cornell University 2017
The new selling techniques enabled by information technologies in today’s market-
places, such as online sales channels, search portals, and review platforms, changed the
consumer-driven demand in many ways. Unlike traditional retail competition, mostly
driven by product attributes (e.g., quality, price, etc.), these selling techniques based
on information technologies have become more important to consider customer behav-
ior and its resulting effect in shaping demand, in order for firms to better plan their
operational strategies. In this dissertation, we investigate different sources of demand
uncertainty and obtain insights into operations of the firms competing in the current
marketplace. We develop methods for more accurate estimations of demand in the pres-
ence of downstream customers’ choice behavior or social interactions. We adopt the
Markov Chain based model to understand customer demand and validate the model us-
ing human-subject experiment and field data. We also conduct empirical research to
capture online browsing behavior of consumers and provide implications to operational
managers.
This dissertation consists of three chapters.
- Chapter 1: The Effect of Social Information on Demand in Quality Competition.
This is joint work with Professor Vishal Gaur and Professor Andrew Davis
- Chapters 2: Predicting Order Variability in Inventory Decisions: A Model of Fore-
cast Anchoring. This is joint work with Professor Andrew Davis and Professor Li
Chen
- Chapter 3: Predicting Purchase Propensity from Online Browsing Behavior. This
is joint work with Professor Vishal Gaur
The three chapters are self-contained but are related to one another: Chapter 1 investi-
gates the impact of social information on demand uncertainty using experimental work,
Chapter 2 explores the sources of amplified demand uncertainty from the downstream
buyers’ inventory decisions, and Chapter 3 empirically explores the effect of online
browsing behavior on demand prediction and is a work-in-progress. All these chap-
ters commonly focus on the behavioral sources of demand endogeneity. Therefore, this
dissertation aims to contribute to improve the accuracy of demand estimation by incor-
porating those behavioral factors into the models in Operations.
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CHAPTER 1
THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL INFORMATION ON DEMAND IN QUALITY
COMPETITION
1.1 Introduction
In the services industry where a firm’s true quality is not explicitly known to consumers,
social information generated through the interaction of people plays a critical role in
determining which firm to visit. Often times, this social information is depicted to
consumers in different ways. For instance, Urbanspoon.com lists the ‘most popular’
restaurants in town, whereas Zocdoc.com displays doctors according to ‘quality ratings’
by patients. In these examples, the overall popularity rankings and number of reviews
contain market share-based information reflecting the choices of consumers, whereas
the average product ratings and reviews contain quality-based information. This raises
the question as to whether consumers respond differently to various aspects of social
information, affecting a firms’ demand characteristics in alternative ways. If so, it is im-
portant that firms understand these differing impacts on demand so that they can make
better operational and planning decisions. Furthermore, it may also help a firm deter-
mine whether they should strategically choose which type of information to promote to
their customers through their own social media outlets. In this study, we investigate the
effects of different types of social information on consumers’ choice between firms, and
their resulting impact on the firms’ market shares and demand uncertainties.
Empirical evidence suggests that social information plays a significant role in how
consumers choose among firms. For example, periodic surveys conducted by Nielsen
illustrate that consumers consider earned recommendations from friends and family as
the most trustworthy source of information followed by information posted on brand-
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managed (owned) websites and consumer opinions posted online as the most reliable
source of information [55]. Additionally, a growing academic literature demonstrates
that humans, when making decisions, learn and are influenced by information in dif-
ferent ways (e.g. [30, 16]). Thus, it is important for firms to understand the effect that
social information has on consumers’ choices for visiting firms, and how this then af-
fects their demand characteristics for better operational decision making. However, in
practice, it is difficult for firms to make this assessment for two reasons: (i) they often
have access to only partial data, i.e., visits by customers to their stores, but not the visits
to competitors’ stores, and (ii) customers are presented with more than one type of social
information simultaneously, so that their effects are difficult to disentangle. This chapter
addresses this problem by conducting a controlled laboratory experiment in which dif-
ferent types of social information are presented to different treatment groups of subjects
and their subsequent choice behavior is analyzed.
In the operations management literature, there has been recent work on the role of
social information and its impact on consumers’ choices (e.g. [74], [58], [39], and [69]).
Additionally, fields such as economics and marketing have incorporated social learning
into consumer choice models ([27, 5, 3]). The marketing literature collectively identifies
the key dimensions of social communication that determine the effectiveness of social
information as the source, the volume, and the valence: the source of information indi-
cates where the information is coming from, the volume of information indicates how
much information on the firm is available, and the valence indicates positivity or nega-
tivity of the contents delivered through social information. However, much of this work
neglects to distinguish between different characteristics of firms disclosed by social in-
formation, such as the number of reviews for a firm versus the average quality rating
of a firm.1 Of the few select works that are an exception to this, Park et al. [60] take a
1Some papers in marketing distinguish between the volume of social information and consumers’
observational learning on others’ choices. We consider that both the volume of information and the
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theoretical approach to investigating the impact of different types of social information
on demand. They find that the market share of competing firms can change when a
consumer’s recency bias interacts with her weight on different types of social informa-
tion. From an empirical standpoint, Chen et al. [22] investigate the effect of two types
of social information using data from Amazon.com. Some other studies exhibit conflict-
ing evidence on how the different types of information influence the performance of the
firms, e.g., [33, 23] and [47]. We contributes to this literature by developing a behavioral
Hidden Markov chain model of consumer choice and conducting a controlled human-
subject experiment that permits us to tease out the effect of two common, but different,
types of social information on consumers’ choices. Markov-chain based choice models
have been used recently in the revenue management problems when consumers make
choices from product assortments [11]. A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) has also been
used by [2] in modeling of individual consumer behavior based on the concept of a con-
version funnel in online advertisements that captures a consumer’s deliberation process.
We apply our model to the data collected from the experiment to assess the usefulness
of social information as well as differences in individual-level consumer behavior with
and without social information.
We begin our study by developing a Markov chain-based choice model for a con-
sumer choosing between two firms. The model yields theoretical predictions for the
firms’ demand characteristics, such as their expected market shares, and demand un-
certainty in the steady state. These theoretical predictions then serve as a basis for our
behavioral hypotheses for consumers’ choices under social information, which we then
directly test in our experiment. We then design a 2x3 between-subject experiment to
represent two situations of quality competition and three scenarios regarding social in-
formation. Each participant acts as a consumer choosing between two firms offering
observational learning are derived from information related to the market shares of competing firms.
3
different service quality levels that are unknown to the consumer. In the first factor, we
manipulate the difference in the average service quality levels between the two firms to
represent a large or a small difference. In the second factor, we vary the type of so-
cial information provided to consumers. Specifically, in a baseline set of treatments, no
social information is provided, and consumers learn strictly from their own decisions
and outcomes. In a second set of treatments, we supplement this with ‘share-based’ so-
cial information, which illustrates the percentage of people that visited each firm in the
previous round. And in a third set of treatments, we provide ‘quality-based’ social infor-
mation, which depicts the percentage of people that received a satisfactory experience
from each firm in the previous round. A novel aspect of our design is that consumers
are divided into cohorts and all of the social information provided is based on all con-
sumers’ actual decisions in a particular cohort in a particular round, and displayed to
each subject in real time.
Our main experimental result is that quality-based information and share-based in-
formation have contrasting effects on a firm’s demand characteristics as well as con-
sumers’ realized satisfaction, depending on whether the difference in service quality
competition is large or small. First consider the scenario where there is a large dif-
ference in service quality between the firms. Under quality-based information, a firm
with higher service quality achieves a 22% increase in market share (from 70.0% to
85.6%), and further benefits from lower demand uncertainty, compared to the case with-
out any social information. Furthermore, a high-quality firm can take advantage of the
increased chance of providing positive consumer experiences. Our data show that con-
sumers’ dependence on social information affects average consumers’ satisfaction rate,
thus affecting the market share and profitability altogether. However, under share-based
information, interestingly, there is almost no benefit to the higher quality firm, only in-
creasing market share by 1% (from 70.0% to 70.8%). In contrast, for the scenario where
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there is a small difference in service quality, and quality-based information is provided,
then the firm with (marginally) higher market share actually experiences a decrease of
9% in market share (from 56.7% to 52.1%), compared to when there is no social in-
formation. Given our duopoly setting, this last result implies that the firm with lower
service quality, can actually benefit from providing quality-based social information to
consumers.
We proceed to utilize our data to examine the mechanism for this outcome at an indi-
vidual consumer level. We find that, for both levels of service competition between the
firms, quality-based information leads to less switching by consumers (between firms)
than share-based information. In fact, quality-based information leads to a higher per-
centage of ‘loyal’ consumers. Thus, quality-based social information can benefit both
firms, from an operational standpoint, through generating more stable consumer behav-
ior and more predictable demand. On the other hand, share-based social information
leads to a more intense switching behavior and shorter sojourn times at firms. In short,
consumers do react to share-based social information, but it does not improve the market
share of the higher quality firm or satisfaction obtained by consumers.
Because our experiment is designed to present the two types of social information
separately, we also conduct an experimental treatment that presents both types of so-
cial information to consumers simultaneously, when the service quality gap between the
firms is large. We find that the behavior of consumers, and the corresponding firms’
demand characteristics, are virtually identical to those observed when only quality-
based information is provided. In particular, the market share for the higher quality
firm is 85.7% when both types of social information are provided, whereas the market
share under only quality-based information, as previously noted, is 85.6%. This pre-
liminary evidence indicates that when both types of social information are displayed
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to consumers, quality-based social information may actually crowd out the effects of
share-based information.
Our study provides a number of managerial implications. First, by understanding
how different types of social information affect consumers’ choices, firms are able to
generate more accurate predictions of market share and demand uncertainty. This trans-
lates into improved operational planning decisions. A second implication stems from
the fact that firms increasingly spend a sizable fraction of their marketing budgets in
managing their own social media. For instance, Sephora has a social media budget of
several million dollars, which it spends on its Facebook page as well as a network on its
own home page [67]. Interestingly, the firm chooses to promote share-based informa-
tion on its products on its Facebook page. Our work provides guidance to firms as to the
type of social information that can be beneficial to them in increasing market share, de-
creasing demand uncertainty, and improving overall profitability, relative to their current
competitive positions.
1.2 Model
We represent a consumer’s learning and choice behavior in this problem as a Markov
Chain. We use the model to test hypotheses on the individual-level consumer behavior
and construct aggregate characteristics of the demand faced by firms.
1.2.1 Model Description
We consider a fixed population of N identical consumers choosing between two firms,
s ∈ {1, 2}, in discrete time periods, t = {1, ...,∞}. The firms are price-takers and identical
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in all respects except their service quality. Let qs ∈ (0, 1) denote the true average service
quality of firm s. When a consumer visits firm s, her experience is measured as a binary
outcome of either satisfaction (1), or dissatisfaction (0) realized from Bernoulli(qs).
We assume that: (1) There are only two firms in the market. We make this assump-
tion for parsimony of the model and ease of design of the experiment. (2) The average
service quality of firm 1 is higher than that of firm 2 (q1 > q2) without loss of generality.
We use the terms ‘firm’ and ‘store’ interchangeably throughout the chapter. (3) Con-
sumers do not know the true average service qualities of the firms. Instead, they decide
which firm to visit in each time period by forming beliefs based on prior experiences
and social information. (4) Consumers are ex-ante identical. As time evolves, they be-
come heterogeneous through differences in experiences and choices. (5) Consumers use
exponential smoothing to update their beliefs. In addition, they may suffer from recency
bias when choosing which firm to visit.
Because consumers are ex-ante identical, we first model the choice behavior of a
single representative consumer and omit the corresponding index. Let St = (At,Y1t,Y2t)
denote the state of the representative consumer at the start of time t, where At,Y1t, and
Y2t are the binary variables. Through the first variable, At, we represent the consumer’s
overall belief about which firm is better at the beginning of period t based on her learning
up to time t − 1. When At = 1, the consumer believes that firm 1 has better quality. In
this case, we call the consumer’s belief as the (G)ood state, because her perception is in
line with the true average service level of the firms. When At = 0, the consumer believes
that firm 2 has better quality, and we call this belief as the (B)ad state.
The second variable, Y1t, denotes the most recent service outcomes experienced by
the consumer from the firm 1. If the consumer visited firm 1 at t − 1 and was satisfied,
then Y1t = 1; if the consumer visited firm 1 at t − 1 and was dissatisfied, Y1t = 0; and
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if the consumer did not visit firm 1 at t − 1, Y1t = Y1,t−1. And Y2t similarly denotes
the most recent service outcome experienced by the consumer from firm 2. Y1t and
Y2t together represent the consumer’s most recent service outcomes from both firms.
These three binary variables define the consumer’s state at t, (At,Y1t,Y2t) = St ∈
S = {(G, 1, 1), (G, 1, 0), (G, 0, 1), (G, 0, 0), (B, 1, 1), (B, 1, 0), (B, 0, 1), (B, 0, 0)}. Since
their values are undefined at t = 1, we initialize the model by assuming that the con-
sumer is equally likely to be in one of the eight states at t = 1. Subsequently, Y1t and Y2t
are observed from the data, but At is a latent (hidden) state variable. We will construct a
maximum likelihood distribution of the consumer’s latent state as a function of observed
outcomes, social information, and own experience information available to her.
Also let Vt ∈ {1, 2} denote the visit choice made by the representative consumer
at time t. This visit choice and outcome probability together determine the state St+1.
We specify how At evolves over time as a function of historical experiences in Section
2.1.1, explain how a consumer decides Vt given state St in Section 2.1.2, and define
social information in Section 2.1.3.
2.1.1. Belief Formation
Let P = [pGG , pGB ; pBG , pBB] denote the transition probabilities from the belief
states in one time period to the next. For instance, pGB defines the probability of a
consumer changing her belief from At = 1 to At = 0, i.e., (G)ood to (B)ad for firm 1. We
use two types of information to update At: own experience and social learning. Thus,
we decompose P into a weighted sum of two matrices, Po and Ps, which jointly allow
the switching of beliefs via a consumer’s (o)wn experience and (s)ocial information.
P =
 pGG pGBpBG pBB
 = (1 − β) · Po + β · Ps, (1.1)
Here, β ∈ [0, 1] captures the weight on social information compared to a consumer’s
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own experience in forming her belief. We use subscripts o and s to denote own and
social information, respectively, throughout the paper.
To define Po and Ps, we adopt leakage probabilities, h and g ∈ (0, 1), that allow
belief switching from one state to the other when new information is not aligned with
the prior belief. We define h as the own learning propensity, i.e., the probability of
switching belief via own experience, and g as the social learning propensity, i.e., the
probability of switching belief via social information.
First, consider the belief update mechanism based on the consumer’s own observa-
tions. If the consumer’s experience at time t does not coincide with her belief, then she
changes her belief with probability h, otherwise her belief remains unchanged. Mathe-
matically,
Po =

1 − hI{Bo} hI{Bo}
hI{Go} 1 − hI{Go}
 , (1.2)
where I{·} = 1 when the consumer’s experience at t is inconsistent with her prior belief
at time t. I{Bo} = 1 and I{Go} = 0 when (1) Vt = 1 and dissatisfied, or (2) Vt = 2 and
satisfied. On the other hand, I{Bo} = 0 and I{Go} = 1 when (1) Vt = 1 and satisfied, or (2)
Vt = 2 and dissatisfied.
For example, suppose a consumer’s prior belief at time t is G (At = 1) at the begin-
ning of the period t. If she chooses to visit firm 1 and is satisfied or chooses to visit firm
2 and is dissatisfied, her experience at t reinforces her prior belief that firm 1 is better.
Thus, her posterior belief is unchanged. On the other hand, if the customer chooses to
visit firm 1 and is dissatisfied or chooses to visit firm 2 and is satisfied, her experience
at t allows her belief to be switched to B (At = 0) with probability h. Thus, h represents
an exponential smoothing parameter in belief formation.
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The belief update mechanism through social information is defined in the same way
as Ps. Mathematically,
Ps =

1 − gI{Bs} gI{Bs}
gI{Gs} 1 − gI{Gs}
 , (1.3)
where I{·} = 1 when the social information at t is inconsistent with the consumer’s prior
belief at time t. I{Bs} = 1 and I{Gs} = 0 when social information at time t favors firm 2.
Likewise, I{Bs} = 0 and I{Gs} = 1 when social information favors firm 1. We define the
modeling of social information in Section 2.1.3.
With these two probabilities, we rewrite the transition matrix (1.1) as follows:
P =

β(1 − gI{Bs}) + (1 − β)(1 − hI{Bo}) βgI{Bs} + (1 − β)hI{Bo}
βgI{Gs} + (1 − β)hI{Go} β(1 − gI{Gs}) + (1 − β)(1 − hI{Go})
 . (1.4)
Therefore, the consumer’s overall belief update depends on the three behavioral pa-
rameters: β captures weight on social information over own information, h captures
responsiveness to her own experience, and g captures responsiveness to social informa-
tion. For example, consider a consumer with prior belief G at the beginning of period t
who chooses to visit firm 2 and is satisfied. If she disregards social information (β = 0),
then with probability h she switches her belief to B after that period. However, if this
consumer gets more positive social information about firm 1 (i.e., better reputation than
firm 2) and disregards her own experience (β = 1), then she sticks to her prior belief
that firm 1 is better (G) with probability one. More likely is the case that the consumer
gives weight to both her own experience and social information (0 < β < 1). Then the
transition probability in our model becomes P = β ·
 1 0g 1 − g
 + (1− β) ·
 1 − h h0 1
 .
2.1.2. Visit Decision
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To define the visit probability, let Rt = Y1t−Y2t+12 ∈ {0, 0.5, 1} combine the recency vari-
ables Y1t and Y2t to represent ‘which firm is better’ from the most recent service en-
counter. Previous research in sequential learning shows that human decision makers are
prone to recency bias, and respond to both their most recent experience and overall past
experience [30, 43, 51]. Evidence also indicates that the past outcomes, except the most
recent outcome, have a similar impact on future choices [28, 54]. Although exponen-
tial smoothing gives a higher weight to more recent experiences, it differs from recency
bias. Therefore, we allow a consumer to associate a higher weight with her most recent
experiences given her overall belief. Thus, we model the probability of visiting firm 1
in time period t given current state (At,Y1t,Y2t) as:
Pr(Vt = 1 | (At,Y1t,Y2t)) = (1 − α) · At + α · Rt, (1.5)
where α ∈ [0, 1] measures the extent of recency bias. If α = 0, the consumer’s visit
decision is driven purely by her overall belief (that is updated through own and social
learning), if α = 1, the choice is purely myopic, and if 0 < α < 1, the consumer is
influenced by her overall belief, yet exhibits recency bias at the same time.
Figure 1.1 shows the transition diagram between the belief states, the outcome (visit)
probability, and the related behavioral parameters in this process.
If we alternatively, expand this to our eight-state Markov Chain, the consumer’s
decision process and learning can be captured as in figure 1.2 shows our that captures
the consumer’s decision process and learning.
Now, we show the complete transition matrix and store visit probabilities in this
Markov chain. Expanding the consumer’s visiting probability of firm 1 conditional on
the state x, v1x is defined as following.
v11 = Pr(visit firm 1 | (G,1,1)) = (1 − α) · 1 + α · 12 = 1 − 0.5α
v12 = Pr(visit firm 1 | (G,1,0)) = (1 − α) · 1 + α · 11 = 1
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Figure 1.1: Transition diagram: transitions between the hidden belief states and
the visit probability
Figure 1.2: Transition diagram between the 8 states ofM(S ).
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v13 = Pr(visit firm 1 | (G,0,1)) = (1 − α) · 1 + α · 01 = 1 − α
v14 = Pr(visit firm 1 | (G,0,0)) = (1 − α) · 1 + α · 12 = 1 − 0.5α
v15 = Pr(visit firm 1 | (B,1,1)) = (1 − α) · 0 + α · 12 = 0.5α
v16 = Pr(visit firm 1 | (B,1,0)) = (1 − α) · 0 + α · 11 = α
v17 = Pr(visit firm 1 | (B,0,1)) = (1 − α) · 0 + α · 01 = 0
v18 = Pr(visit firm 1 | (B,0,0)) = (1 − α) · 0 + α · 12 = 0.5α
Again, a consumer’s visit probability of firm 2 given the state x, v2x, is 1 − v1x. This
structure in current configuration imposes a consumer’s higher likelihood of revisiting
the firm with satisfactory experience. For example, v13 = 1 − α renders that a consumer
is not likely to choose firm 1 with certainty even if her prior belief is G, but with positive
probability 1 − α. The probability of visiting firm 1 decreases with the weight on the
most recent experience, however, this decrease in probability is smaller in v11, if her most
recent experience from the firm 1 was also satisfactory.
It is notable that own learning propensity is embedded with probability h. For
instance, if the consumer was dissatisfied from firm 1 while the belief being G, she
switches her overall belief to B with probability h. This gives us 8 × 8 transition
matrix P by combining the store visit probabilities and the switching propensity. Let
P = [[PGG, PGB], [PBG, PBB]], where PGB defines the transition sub-matrix from states
G to B and PGG, PBG, and PBB have analogous definitions. The values of the transition
probabilities are:
PGG =
v11q1 + v
2
1q2(1 − h) v21(1 − q2) v11(1 − q1)(1 − h) 0
v22q2(1 − h) v12q1 + v22(1 − q2) 0 v12(1 − q1)(1 − h)
v13q1 0 v
1
3(1 − q1)(1 − h) + v23q2(1 − h) v23(1 − q2)
0 v14q1 v
2
4q2(1 − h) v14(1 − q1)(1 − h) + v24(1 − q2)

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PGB =
v21q2h 0 v
1
1(1 − q1)h 0
v22q2h 0 0 v
1
2(1 − q1)h
0 0 v13(1 − q1)h + v23q2h 0
0 0 v24q2h v
1
4(1 − q1)h

PBG =
v15q1h v
2
5(1 − q2)h 0 0
0 v16q1h + v
2
6(1 − q2)h 0 0
v17q1h 0 0 v
2
7(1 − q2)h
0 v18q1h 0 v
2
8(1 − q2)h

PBB =
v15q1(1 − h) + v25q2 v25(1 − q2)(1 − h) v15(1 − q1) 0
v26q2 v
1
6q1(1 − h) + v26(1 − q2)(1 − h) 0 v16(1 − q1)
v17q1(1 − h) 0 v17(1 − q1) + v27q2 v27(1 − q2)(1 − h)
0 v18q1(1 − h) v28q2 v18(1 − q1) + v28(1 − q2)(1 − h)

This completes the description of the eight-state Markov chain model of consumer
behavior in response to previous service experiences. Using the stationary distribution
of this model, we can conduct preliminary simulation to generate the steady-state market
share and the variance of the High-firm. Figure 1.3 and 1.4 show the impact of the α and
h on predicted demand. Figure 1.3 shows that the long-term market share of High-firm
decreases and the variance increases with more weight on recency bias (α). Figure 1.4
shows that the long-term market share of High-firm decreases and the variance increases
with higher learning propensity (h).2
For instance, consider the transition probability from (G,1,0) to (B,1,1), which has a
value of Pr(Visit Firm 2 | state = (G, 1, 0)) · q2 · h. In order for this transition to occur,
2These simulation results display non-monotonicity due to the non-linearity of our model. Thus, we
report only the reasonable range of parameters in the Figure 1.3 and 1.4.
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Figure 1.3: Preliminary simulation result: Expected market share and the variance
of High-firm with respect to the weight on recency bias α
Figure 1.4: Preliminary simulation result: Expected market share and the variance
of High-firm with respect to the own learning propensity h
the consumer must choose to visit firm 2 and experience satisfaction. This probability
is Pr(visit the firm 2 | state = (G, 1, 0)) · q2. Further, the consumer, who previously
believed that firm 1 had better quality, changes her belief from G to B with probability
h. Combining these steps of the decision process gives us the transition probability. This
characterizes the consumer’s decision process affected by a two-fold memory structure
with (1) an (unobserved) overall belief formed by past experiences up to time t, and (2)
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the most recent experience (observed) from a consumer’s visit to each firm.
2.1.3. Social Information
To model social information (SI, hereafter), we partition the N consumers into disjoint
subsets that represent social networks. We retrieve two different types of social informa-
tion from the network and provide them to consumers separately at the end of period t.
The first type, ‘share-based’ SI, is defined as the percentage of consumers in a network
who visit each firm. This information gives an estimate of market share of each firm
in the network, or equivalently, the average of visit probabilities of consumers in the
network, in period t. We say that share-based SI favors firm 1 (firm 2) if the observed
market share of firm 1 (firm 2) is higher than that of firm 2 (firm 1), and is ambiguous
if market shares are identical.3 The second type, ‘quality-based’ SI, is defined as the
percentage of consumers in a network who had satisfactory outcomes at the two firms.
This information provides estimates of q1 and q2 from the experiences of consumers in
the network in period t. Quality-based SI is undefined if no consumer in the network
visited a firm in period t. Similar to share-based SI, we say that quality-based SI favors
firm 1 (firm 2) if the observed average satisfaction from firm 1 (firm 2) is higher than
that from firm 2 (firm 1), and is ambiguous if satisfaction rates are identical.4 Thus, we
incorporate these two different types of social information in the belief formation for
each consumer.
Social information introduces a complexity that the transition matrix of a consumer
is a function of the states and transitions of all consumers in her network. Thus, the states
and transitions of consumers are correlated with each other. We simulate this correlation
in our experiment by generating social information dynamically in each period using the
3We say that 50% visited firm 1 and 50% visited firm 2.
4We report the satisfactions from each firm as it is, so it does not matter when they are identical. If no
consumers choose one firm, we just say no one visited that firm.
16
actual choices and visit outcomes of consumers. Thus, the experiment moves lock step
from one time period to the next.
This completes the description of our model. It is a parsimonious model with only
four parameters to be estimated. We considered alternative formulations of learning
from historical experiences, but the state space of the model explodes quickly. Even
a regression-based robustness test of our model (presented in Section 1.5.1) requires
more parameters than the Markov chain model. The simplified binary states of belief
of our model reflect the real-world where consumers often remember only the superior-
ity/inferiority of a firm relative to its competitors rather than keeping track of each firm’s
quality level in absolute scales. By keeping the dimension of the state space minimal,
our model is parsimonious, yet it predicts demand, and captures the salient aspects of a
consumer’s probability of visiting a store, namely, the overall beliefs about quality and
the recency bias. Moreover, in forming the overall belief, two learning components from
the consumer’s own experience and social information are integrated into the latent state
variable.
1.2.2 Hypotheses
Our first hypothesis tests the validity of the model. We hypothesize that consumers are
susceptible to recency bias, but also form beliefs using own and social information, and
utilize these beliefs in their store visit choice.
Hypothesis 1
(i) Consumers demonstrate moderate levels of recency bias (α > 0), and own-learning
propensity (h > 0).
(ii) Consumers respond to SI (β > 0), and demonstrate moderate levels of social-
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learning propensity (g > 0).
Based on this hypothesized behavior of consumers, we can characterize demand by
computing the following metrics from the estimated model: (1) the market share of
each firm, (2) the variance of its demand, and (3) the speed of convergence of demand
distribution to the steady state. We hypothesize that the availability of social information
improves these metrics for the higher quality firm, i.e., firm 1.
Hypothesis 2
Comparing the marketplace under social information with the marketplace without so-
cial information, the High-firm
(i) realizes a higher market share,
(ii) realizes a lower variance of demand, and
(iii) has a faster rate of convergence of its market share to the steady state value.
To set up this hypothesis, we reason as follows. When consumers are not exposed
to SI, their learning is from own experiences alone. However, a consumer visits only
one firm in each period, and thus, can update beliefs about one firm in each period.
When they are exposed to SI, human subjects will utilize the increased availability of
information (β > 0). Further, both types of social information are correlated with the
true quality of the firms. Thus, consumers exposed to SI will learn at a faster rate that
firm 1 is the higher quality firm. Moreover, their choices will be correlated with each
other, which would lead to a higher market share for firm 1 and a lower variance of
demand. Finally, when a consumer is exposed to SI, it may increase the relative weight
on beliefs and decrease the extent of recency bias α. This factor would also result in
higher market share and lower variance of demand for firm 1.
Besides testing these hypotheses, we assess the effect of social information by
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benchmarking our experimental results against outcomes from two models in the lit-
erature: the Wins-Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS) model [63] and Bayesian learning [9, 31].
WSLS consumers, at one extreme, are fully myopic and respond to the most recent ex-
perience only. Bayesian learners, at the other extreme, utilize all previous experiences.
Both these models are based on own experiences; they do not incorporate social infor-
mation.
1.2.3 Parameter Estimation
We estimate the parameters of our model using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).
Our data set consists of the observed visit decisions, satisfaction outcomes, and social
information for all consumers for all t. Thus, we compute the likelihood of observed
visit decisions as a function of the model parameters and maximize it using the data set.
Let piit be a vector denoting a probability distribution defined over the state spaceS of
the Markov chain for consumer i in period t. We call piit as the belief-state probabilities.
To initialize the model, we assume that each consumer has an equal probability of being
in any of the eight states at t = 1, and moreover, she has an equal probability of visiting
either firm. Subsequently, the visit decisions and outcomes allow us to define I{Go}, I{Bo},
I{Gs}, and I{Bs} for all consumers in all periods. Using these values and the transition
matrix defined in (1.4), the new belief-state probabilities can be computed iteratively in
period t + 1 from piit. The next step is the setting up of the likelihood function. The
likelihood of consumer i visiting firm 1 in period t is given by
∑
Sit∈S piit(Sit)Pr(Vit =
1 | Sit). Likewise for the likelihood of visiting firm 2. Thus, the likelihood is also
calculated iteratively as a function of the evolving belief-state probabilities, historical
outcomes, and historical social information up to period t − 1. Next, we determine the
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parameters that jointly maximize the loglikelihood of observed visit choices.
αˆ, βˆ, hˆ, gˆ = arg max
α,β,h,g
∑
i,t
logL(α, β, h, g; Vit,Y1it,Y2it for all i, t)
= arg max
α,β,h,g
∑
i,t
logPr(Vit|α, β, h, g).
We estimated the parameters using both a constrained non-linear optimization method
and grid search. Both methods yielded consistent results. The estimated parameters are
discussed in Section 1.4.1.
After parameter estimation, we calculate the long-term market share, variance of de-
mand, and rate of convergence towards steady state for each firm. With α, β, h, g > 0,
we have an irreducible, aperiodic, and regular Markov Chain on the finite state space.
Therefore, there exists a stationary distribution pi = limt→∞ piit. This stationary probabil-
ity of the hidden belief states and the visit probabilities (1.5) allow us to calculate the
long-run market share and variance of demand for firm 1. Additionally, the convergence
speed of piit to pi is determined by the size of the second-largest eigenvalue, λ2, of the
transition matrix. This metric shows how quickly a consumer’s belief-state probability
converges to its stationary distribution. It thus indicates how fast a firm benefits from
social information compared to the scenario without social information. We compute
the convergence speeds under different treatments in our model in Section 1.4.4 and
we explain in Appendix 1.7.2 why the second-largest eigenvalue (SLE) determines the
convergence speed.
1.3 Experimental Design
We design our experiment to replicate the setting defined in Section 1.2. Each subject
plays the role of a consumer choosing among two stores competing through their service
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quality. In each round, after a subject chooses to visit a store, the computer returns
either Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction from the chosen store, generated by a Bernoulli
distribution, where the mean service quality levels of each firm, q1 and q2, are unknown
to the consumer.
The experiment follows a between-subject design. Each subject participates in one
treatment among 2×3 possible combinations given by two different quality competition
settings and three information settings. For the quality competition settings, we use two
different sets of mean service levels (q1, q2) = (0.8, 0.5), which we refer to as a large-gap
competition condition and (q1, q2) = (0.55, 0.5), referred to as a small-gap competition
condition. To investigate the effect of different types of SI, we use three information
settings: (1) a control treatment with no SI (2) a share-based information treatment,
and (3) a quality-based information treatment. In the share-based treatment, in each
period, we provide subjects with the percentage of visitors to each firm as additional
feedback, e.g., “For this period, 30% of your acquaintances visited store A, and 70%
of your acquaintances visited store B.” In the quality-based treatment, in each period,
we display the satisfaction rate of consumers for each firm, e.g., “For this period, 60%
of your acquaintances who visited store A experienced satisfaction, and 20% of your
acquaintances who visited store B experienced satisfaction.” Thus, we distinguish be-
tween two different kinds of social information that are typically available to consumers
in practice.
As mentioned previously, in the SI treatments, we interactively collect the decisions
made by the subjects in each period to provide information in the following period,
instead of using pre-generated outcomes. Using real-time information of the actual sub-
jects’ choices/experiences better captures the true process of SI generation in practice.
Moreover, we randomize the social network in each period. Specifically, each session of
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the experiment consists of 18 subjects, who are randomly placed into a group of nine in
each period. In the treatments with SI, after each round, all of the decisions are collected
from the eight other people in a subject’s group and used as the SI for that subject. Thus,
after each period of decision making, each subject is presented with not only her own
service encounter but also certain social information regarding eight other subjects. We
inform subjects that all feedback provided, including the information on others’ visits
and experiences, is generated from their actual choices and real-time experiences in the
laboratory.
There are 36 subjects in each of the six treatments. A subject’s main task is to
choose either store A or B on the computer screen in each time period. This decision
task is conducted for 40 periods. The arrangement of displaying high- and low- quality
store as store A or B on screen is randomized across subjects (which is unknown to
them). For the duration of the experiment, subjects can observe their history of choices,
outcomes, and SI, when applicable. After completing 40 periods of decision making,
we ask the subjects to provide their own estimate of service quality of each firm. To
maintain incentive compatibility for this post-experiment question, we award subjects
additional earnings if their answer lies within a certain range of the true average service
quality.
Subjects in our experiment were recruited from a university located in the northeast
U.S. The average total compensation was approximately $20 per participant. Each time
a subject received satisfaction from her visit choice, one point was given, corresponding
to $0.50. These earnings were totaled across the 40 rounds and added to a $5 partic-
ipation fee. Each session lasted about 40 minutes, and the software was programmed
using the z-Tree system [29]. Instructions, screen shots, and more details about our
experimental design are available upon request.
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1.4 Results
In this section we first report the parameters of our Markov chain model, estimated us-
ing the experimental data, in subsection 1.4.1, and conclude on Hypothesis 1. Then, we
summarize our three demand characteristics of interest (market share, demand uncer-
tainty, and convergence speed), in subsections 1.4.2, 1.4.3, and 1.4.4, and conclude on
each component of Hypothesis 2.
1.4.1 Parameter Estimation
In Table 1.1, we first report the two-parameter model estimation results, without consid-
eration of SI (i.e. h = g = 0). The behavioral parameters, all significant, demonstrate
that consumers show moderate levels of recency bias and learning propensity under all
treatments. Moreover, the presence of SI appears to create a difference in the amount of
recency bias. For instance, for both levels of service competition, large-gap and small
gap, α is lower under quality-based SI, indicating that consumers are less susceptible
to a recency bias when quality-based SI is provided. Also, note that, when interpreting
the magnitude of the estimates, only comparisons across different types of SI within a
particular level of service competition are meaningful (since different values of q1 and
q2 are used in different service competition treatments).
In Table 1.2, we report the estimate results using all four parameters. Note that
the most striking effect of social learning exists under quality-based SI under large-
gap competition. Under this treatment, consumers utilize quality-based SI significantly
(β = 0.58), and display relatively low recency bias (α = 0.16). We also observe higher
own-learning (h = 0.29) and social-learning (g = 0.17) propensities than the other
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Table 1.1: Two parameter model estimates
Large-gap Small-gap
Parameter Description (Control) Share-info Qual-info (Control) Share-info Qual-info
α Recency 0.33 0.29 0.11 0.27 0.39 0.23
bias (0.046) (0.044) (0.055) (0.042) (0.038) (0.041)
h Own-learning 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.11 0.07
propensity (0.022) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.012)
Log likelihood -688.2 -738.6 -557.0 -865.8 -874.9 -897.2
BIC 1390.7 1491.7 1128.2 1746.1 1764.3 1808.9
Note: All parameters are significant with p < 0.01. Standard errors from inverse Hessian matrix are in
parentheses.
treatments, which means a consumer’s overall belief transition is actively influenced
by both learning from their own recent experience and via the social information about
others’ experiences.
In all four SI treatments, in Table 1.2, we continue to observe that consumers’ belief
switching is more influenced by their own experience than others (h > g). In addi-
tion, SI is utilized by consumers under share-based SI treatments (β > 0), despite the
fact that this information does not directly signal the true service quality of the firms.
However, when we compare the overall fit in Table 1.2 to that in Table 1.1, it would
appear as though including the two SI-related parameters, β and g, only improves the fit
in quality-based SI under large-gap competition, which is evidenced by the smaller BIC
value. Furthermore, a series of Likelihood Ratio tests confirms that the four parameter
model, which explicitly incorporates the impact of SI, is preferred in the quality-based
SI treatment with large-gap competition (p < 0.001).
Before concluding on Hypothesis 1, it is important to note that we also estimated
24
Table 1.2: Four parameter model estimates
Large-gap Small-gap
Parameter Description (Control) Share-info Qual-info (Control) Share-info Qual-info
α Recency 0.33 0.29 0.16 0.27 0.39 0.23
bias (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.042) (0.038) (0.041)
β Weight 0.15 0.58 0.13 0.01∗
on SI (0.068) (0.077) (0.085) (0.147)
h Own-learning 0.15 0.17 0.29 0.14 0.11 0.07
propensity (0.022) (0.021) (0.055) (0.018) (0.021) (0.012)
g Social-learning 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.01∗
propensity (0.067) (0.029) (0.071) (0.017)
Log likelihood -688.2 -736.6 -543.1 -865.8 -873.8 -897.2
BIC 1390.7 1502.3 1114.7 1746.1 1776.7 1823.4
Note: ∗Parameters are not statistically significant. Standard errors from inverse Hessian matrix are in
parentheses.
the model at an individual level. Unsurprisingly, there is some heterogeneity in the
estimates among subjects, but the average values of the parameters do not deviate sig-
nificantly from the aggregate-level estimates presented above. Therefore, to summarize,
Hypothesis 1 -(i) is fully supported - subjects demonstrate moderate levels of recency
bias and own-learning propensity, whereas Hypothesis 1 -(ii) is partially supported -
consumers directly respond to quality-based SI when there is a large-gap in the level of
service competition.
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Prediction Accuracy of the Model
One important way in which firms can benefit from understanding the SI-induced
change in consumer behavior is by improving their demand forecasting. Here, we report
the predictive performance of our model by simulating the choice paths of consumers.
Using the estimated parameters from Table 1.2, we generate the simulated choice paths
of consumers, and thus, predict the market share.
Table 1.3: Prediction error in the hold-out samples (period 31-40)
Large-gap Small-gap
(Control) Share-info Qual-info (Control) Share-info Qual-info
HMM model MAD 0.35 0.22 0.16 0.46 0.41 0.43
(% improvement) (insig.) (39.8%) (48.5%) (insig.) (9.8%) (11.3%)
Note: “% improvement” compared to the WSLS prediction (no improvement under control group).
In Table 1.3, we present the mean-absolute deviations (MAD) of the model’s (HMM)
prediction to the observations in periods 31-40. It also illustrates the percent improve-
ment from the model’s predictions compared to that of the WSLS consumers’ simulated
choice paths. One can immediately observe that the prediction errors are smaller under
SI treatments, and that, with SI, the model better explains the choice behavior of con-
sumers compared to the WSLS prediction. Particularly, the prediction accuracy of the
model increases considerably with the presence of SI under large-gap competition.
1.4.2 Market Share
To understand the consequences of this behavior on the firms, we next turn to firm-level
demand characteristics. Our first firm-level demand characteristic of interest is average
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market share. Given that the proportion of consumers choosing the High-firm and Low-
firm sums up to one, for presentation purposes, we report only the High-firm’s market
share. In Table 1.4, we provide the average market share of the High-firm in each treat-
ment, along with two benchmarks: the predicted market share if consumers followed a
Win-Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS) strategy (α = 1), or behaved like perfect Bayesian con-
sumers (α = 0).5 As seen in Table 1.4, under both competition levels, the market share
of the High-firm in the control treatment falls between the predicted market share of
WSLS and Bayesian consumers – human subjects chose the High-firm more frequently
than WSLS consumers, but not as often as Bayesian consumers. Turning to the SI
treatments, it is interesting to note that the average market share of the High-firm in
the quality-based information treatment under large-gap competition (85.6%), is nearly
identical to the Bayesian prediction (86.6%), whereas under small-gap competition, it is
almost the same (52.1%) as the WSLS prediction (52.5%).
To conclude on Hypothesis 2 -(i), we must compare the average market share of the
High-firm under different types of SI (Table 1.4). Beginning with the share-based infor-
mation treatments, one can see that the average market share of the High-firm is virtually
identical to the control treatment, for both levels of competition. However, the average
market share under quality-based information is significantly different compared to the
control treatment, albeit in opposite directions, depending on the level of competition.
In particular, under large-gap competition, the average market share with quality-based
information is 85.6%, which is significantly higher than both the control and share-based
SI conditions (t-tests, both p < 0.01). On the other hand, under small-gap competition,
the market share of the High-firm under quality-based information is actually lower than
the control treatment, weakly significantly so (t-test, p < 0.10). Note that this final result
implies that the Low-firm, under small-gap competition may benefit from quality-based
5Please see Appendix 1.7.1 for details of these benchmarks.
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Table 1.4: Market share of the High-firm under different SI treatments
SI treatment Large-gap Small-gap
(Control) 70.0% 56.7%
(1.2%) (1.0%)
Share-based info 70.8% 58.1%
(2.0%) (1.3%)
Quality-based info 85.6%∗∗∗ 52.1%∗∗
(1.4%) (1.3%)
Bayesian benchmark 86.6% 62.9%
(2.0%) (0.8%)
WSLS benchmark 67.6% 52.5%
(1.8%) (1.7%)
Note: ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.1 t-tests comparing SI treatments to Control. Standard errors over time in
parentheses.
information, as a reduction in the High-firm’s market share increases the market share of
the Low-firm, from 43.4% (High-firm 56.7%) to 47.9% (High-firm 52.1%). Therefore,
Hypothesis 2 -(i) is partially supported, for quality-based information under large-gap
competition.
The contrasting market share results under large and small-gap competition in the
quality-based information treatment warrants additional discussion, and can be under-
stood by returning to the behavioral parameter estimates in Table 1.2. Specifically, re-
call that consumers’ actively use quality-based SI under large-gap competition, but not
small-gap competition. This implies that a firm’s promotion of quality-based informa-
tion can magnify the impact of the actual quality gap between the competitors with
respect to their market share. Thus, quality-based information can overly detriment the
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Low-firm under large-gap competition, but provide potential benefits under small-gap
competition, relative to the firm’s true quality difference with its competitor.
Consumer Satisfaction
Increased market share is clearly desired by firms, but with it comes an additional benefit
when there is SI. That is, a higher market share allows a firm a better chance of providing
a satisfactory experience for consumers, which not only impacts a consumer’s willing-
ness to revisit the same firm, but also re-generates positive social influence for others.
Indeed, when positive information is naturally generated through satisfactory outcomes,
as in our setting, the market share can further favor one of the competing firms.
Table 1.5: Average satisfaction rates of all subjects in each treatment, and the sub-
jects visiting each firms
Large-gap Small-gap
Description (Control) Share-info Qual-info (Control) Share-info Qual-info
Overall Satisfaction 69.8% 70.1% 74.4%∗ 54.0% 51.8% 50.8%
Satisfactiona from High-firm 76.0% 77.9% 79.2%∗ 53.3% 53.7% 48.4%∗
Satisfaction from Low-firm 49.2% 44.9% 36.1%∗ 47.3% 43.2% 46.7%
Note: ∗p < 0.01, significant difference with the subjects in other SI treatments.
Table 1.5 depicts the overall satisfaction rates of consumers who visit each firm,
by treatment. One interesting observation is that the satisfaction rates for each firm,
which theoretically should be the same across different SI treatments, within the same
level of quality competition, show systematic differences. Consider the second and third
rows of numbers, which report the average satisfaction rate of from subjects from each
firm. One might note that all of these numbers are below the firms’ true average service
qualities, and, in certain SI conditions, the Low-firm achieves an exceptionally low sat-
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isfaction rate. This is because consumers do not switch randomly between firms, rather,
they may be more inclined to switch after a failed service (and depending on the SI).
For example, in the quality-based information treatment in large-gap competition, the
consumer satisfaction rate from the Low-firm is only 36.1%, and this is considerably
lower than the consumer satisfaction under the control treatment in large-gap competi-
tion, 49.2%. Instead, the average satisfaction rate should be close to 50%. However, in
general, when a consumer visits the Low-firm, there is a relatively higher likelihood of
receiving a dissatisfactory experience. Combined with quality-based SI, the consumer
may also receive positive information about the High-firm, causing the consumer to
switch to the High-firm. Once at the High-firm, however, there is a lower likelihood of
a dissatisfactory experience, and to see SI that would cause them to switch back to the
Low-firm. The net result is that the High-firm can achieve an even greater advantage in
terms of providing satisfactory experiences to consumers, under quality SI in large-gap
competition.
This result is consistent with Park et al. [60], as a low estimate of service quality
leads to longer time between a consumer’s subsequent visits, and so, less occasion to
learn the service quality offered by a firm. We conclude that under the circumstances
where consumers are not well informed about the true service level offered by firms,
their dependence on SI affects the chances for firms to provide satisfaction to consumers,
thus affecting the market share and profitability altogether.
1.4.3 Demand Uncertainty
Our second firm level characteristic of interest pertains to the uncertainty of demand.
Figure 1.5 plots the standard deviation of demand (market share) over time. One can see
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Figure 1.5: Demand uncertainty under different types of SI (standard deviation)
under Large-gap (left) and Small-gap (right) treatment
that demand uncertainty varies across SI treatments. In particular, under quality-based
information, for all decision periods, we observe a significant reduction in demand un-
certainty in large-gap competition (t-tests, across all p < 0.01). Combining this with
our previous findings on average market share implies that, when the firm with sig-
nificantly higher quality promotes quality-based information, it not only benefits from
increased market share, but from reduced demand uncertainty as well. In such a case,
the Low-firm will lose a significant portion of its consumers to its competitor, achieve
considerably lower market share, and also face higher demand uncertainty. Therefore,
like the impact of SI on market share, Hypothesis 2 -(ii), which states that the vari-
ance of demand will be reduced with social information, is partially supported, under
quality-based information with large-gap competition.
Switching Behavior
To further investigate demand uncertainty, we also looked into the individual consumers’
choice behavior (since the variance of demand only captures the number of visitors
rather than the composite of consumers). To this end, the left-hand side of Table 1.6
shows how frequently an average consumer switches between firms, and the right-hand
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side of Table 1.6 shows the average time each subject spends in one firm before switch-
ing, along with the predictions according to the Bayesian and WSLS benchmarks (the
right hand side can be interpreted as the average Sojourn time between transitions among
the states out of 40 total periods).
Table 1.6: Percentage of time switching and expected sojourn time over 40 peri-
ods
% of time switching Ei(S o journ time)
Large-gap Small-gap Large-gap Small-gap
(Control) 25.7% 31.3% 9.1 4.4
Share-based info 24.8% 34.6% 5.5∗ 3.5∗
Quality-based info 18.4% 29.6% 10.8 5.0
Bayesian benchmark 11.5% 15.9% 11.3 8.4
WSLS benchmark 31.5% 45.6% 3.5 2.3
Note: ∗p < 0.01 for t-tests with the control treatment.
Compared to the theoretical benchmarks, in Table 1.6, it appears that subjects stay
in one firm longer than the WSLS consumers, but shorter than the Bayesian consumers,
on average across all treatments. Comparing treatments to one another, under share-
based information, average sojourn time is significantly lower than the other treatments,
both in large-gap and small-gap competition. Furthermore, while not depicted, we find
that all of the subjects in the share-based information treatment switched at least once,
whereas some subjects never switched at all in the other treatments.
Taking this analysis a step further, we label the subjects who stay in one firm more
than 10 consecutive periods on average, i.e., individuals with E(S o journ time) > 10, as
‘Loyal consumers,’ and subjects who switch frequently, i.e., with E(S o journ time) < 2,
as ‘Frequent switchers.’ We present the percentage of these subjects in each treatment in
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Figure 1.6: Percentage of frequent switchers and loyal consumers under different
SI treatments
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Figure 1.6. As one can see, in the quality-based information treatment under large-gap
competition, more than 35% of subjects behave like loyal customers, on average. On the
other hand, in the share-based information treatment, the proportion of loyal customers
is the lowest, for both levels of competition (11% under large-gap, 0% under small-gap).
This evidence suggests that quality-based information boosts loyalty for the High-firm
under large-gap competition, whereas share-based information reduces loyal customers
and promotes switching regardless of the level of competition.6
6To test whether the deviation from Bayesian choice can be explained by subjects’ most recent expe-
rience and by SI, we use a Logit model with P(Deviation f rom Bayes Choice = 1|Xi) as a dependent
variable, which captures only (unnecessary) switching of subjects to a firm with lower estimate of service
quality each period. We observed that the exploration to the Low-firm decreases with the most recent
satisfaction from the High-firm, and increases with the recent satisfaction from the Low-firm. More in-
terestingly, both of the SI types significantly affected the result: share-based information increases this
exploration to the firm with the lower estimate of service quality, whereas positive quality-based informa-
tion from the High-firm decreases unnecessary switching. This evidence confirms that overall deviations
from the Bayesian choices increase under share-based information, whereas the valence of quality-based
information directly impacts the switching of the consumers.
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1.4.4 Convergence Speed
We now consider our third demand characteristic, by analyzing the convergence speed
of the transition probability (between the unobserved belief states of our model).
Table 1.7 reports the convergence measures based on our current model assumption
where the demand is formed by unobserved belief states (G or B). In the long run, how
the overall belief states of aggregate consumers settles to its equilibrium determines the
market share convergence speed.
Table 1.7: Stationary probability (pi) of the belief transition matrix P and the con-
vergence speed measures
Competition treatment SI treatment
Stationary dist. Minimum periods SLE
pi= [piG, piB] for P ∈ {pi ± 0.01} λ2
(Control) [ 0.666 , 0.334 ] 26 periods 0.847
Large-gap Share-based info [ 0.717∗, 0.283 ] 25 periods 0.843
Quality-based info [ 0.791∗, 0.209 ] 18 periods 0.782
(Control) [ 0.531 , 0.469 ] 28 periods 0.864
Small-gap Share-based info [ 0.562 , 0.438 ] 35 periods 0.889
Quality-based info [ 0.512 , 0.488 ] 54 periods 0.929
Note: ∗Limit probability of overall belief being G, piG, is significantly higher than E(Rt) observed from data.
SLE represents “second-largest eigenvalue.”
First, in Table 1.7 note that the stationary distribution of the overall belief being G,
for large-gap competition, is highest in quality-based SI (piG = 0.791), and in small-gap
competition, is highest in share-based SI (piG = 0.562). With the behavioral parameter
estimates in Table 1.2, and the different information set of each subject, we reconstructed
the belief-transition probabilities P uniquely under different treatments, such that the
limit probabilities and the convergence speed to equilibrium vary across treatments. A
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higher stationary probability of the overall belief being G leads to a frequent visit to the
High-firm. In short, the results here are consistent with our previous observations that
the market share is highest in quality-based SI under large-gap competition, and high-
est in share-based SI under small-gap competition (recall Table 1.4, which illustrated
average market share by treatment).
Second, continuing in Table 1.7, consumers’ overall belief status converges to its
stationary probability quickest in quality-based SI under large-gap competition. In par-
ticular, within 18 periods, belief switching probabilities converge within the bound of
0.01 from the limit probabilities. The second-largest eigenvalue (SLE) is also smallest
in this treatment (λ2 = 0.782), providing further support for fastest convergence to sta-
bility, making the demand forecast easier in earlier periods (please see Appendix 1.7.2
for a further discussion and technical details).
Third, in Table 1.7, note that the speed of the belief converging to equilibrium is
significantly slower with SI treatments under small-gap competition. This is due to the
average quality being similar between firms, under small-gap competition, and thus,
the SI generated based on consumers’ experience naturally exhibits relatively higher
variance. Therefore, this potentially leads to non-informative SI, and does not improve
consumer learning and the settlement of beliefs.
In sum, our convergence analysis allows us to conclude that Hypothesis 2 -(iii) is
supported under quality-based information in the large-gap competition treatment, but
not across all SI treatments. Faster convergence speed is driven by the fact that, in
our analyses on market share, the presence of quality-based information significantly
favors the High-firm, which is compounded by a moderated recency bias and increased
learning propensities, particularly under large-gap competition.
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1.5 Robustness Checks
Here we report two robustness checks for our study, each which differ in their focus. The
first serves as a robustness check for our Markov chain-based model and its estimates,
where we build an alternative Logit model. The second pertains to our experiment,
where we report results from an additional experimental treatment which provided both
share-based and quality-based information to subjects, under large-gap competition.
1.5.1 Supporting Alternative Logit Model
For our Logit model, we express the probability of a customer choosing the High-firm
as a function of hypothesized state variables, such as the consumer’s weight on the most
recent experience, the consumer’s weight on the past experiences, and the numerical
values of each type of SI presented to subjects. Let ρ = p(Vt = 1 | (At,Rt)) in (1.5), then
log(
ρ
1 − ρ ) = β0+βrecent∗Experi,t−1+βcumulative∗Experi,1:t−2+βS I∗S I+βp∗Period+νi+i,t.
We run this model with random effects, where the probability of a consumer choos-
ing the High-firm at time t becomes equivalent to E(Market share of the High-firm at t).
Note that we include dummy variables for the most recent experience, Experi,t−1, from
both firms, and also include average past experience Experi,1:t−2 from all previous trials
of each firm to represent overall learning. In order to determine whether we included a
sufficient number of recent experiences in the model, we ran an AR(n) test. Our tests
proved that an AR(1) model best explains our experimental data, which is consistent
with our Markov model setting. For SI, S hareIn f oi,t−1 captures the actual proportion of
the High-firm visitors displayed to a subject i at the end of period t−1, QualityIn f o1i,t−1
captures the proportion of satisfied visitors at the High-firm at the end of each period
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t − 1, and QualityIn f o2i,t−1 captures the proportion of satisfied visitors at the Low-firm
at the end of each period t − 1 displayed to each subject i.
Table 1.8: Logit regression on the choice of the High-firm by each treatment
Large-gap Small-gap
Variable Description (Control) Share-info Qual-info (Control) Share-info Qual-info
Constant Intercept 0.571 0.127 -1.874∗ -0.048 -0.552 -0.639
(0.493) (0.577) (0.883) (0.303) (0.394) (0.414)
Experience1i,t−1 Recent satis 0.833∗∗ 1.108∗∗ 0.993∗∗ 1.076∗∗ 0.913∗∗ 0.862∗∗
from High-firm (0.171) (0.172) (0.218) (0.163) (0.156) (0.167)
Experience2i,t−1 Recent satis -0.711∗∗ -0.513∗ -0.870∗∗ -0.939∗∗ -0.919∗∗ -0.970∗∗
from Low-firm (0.210) (0.216) (0.304) (0.172) (0.176) (0.176)
Experience1i,1:t−2 Cumulative satis 1.329∗∗ 1.769∗∗ 2.300∗∗ 1.764∗∗ 1.708∗∗ 2.541∗∗
from High-firm (0.506) (0.519) (0.817) (0.381) (0.418) (0.408)
Experience2i,1:t−2 Cumulative satis -2.208∗∗ -2.491∗∗ -1.736∗∗ -1.651∗∗ -1.379∗∗ -1.545∗∗
from Low-firm (0.523) (0.451) (0.438) (0.369) (0.405) (0.429)
S hareIn f oi,t−1 Market share-info -0.173 0.474
of High-firm (0.473) (0.387)
QualityIn f o1i,t−1 Quality-info 2.833∗∗ 0.590∗
of High-firm (0.622) (0.273)
QualityIn f o2i,t−1 Quality-info -1.625∗∗ -0.605∗
of Low-firm (0.229) (0.268)
Period Period 0.008 0.030∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.006 0.011∗ 0.013∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
n 32 36 31 36 36 35
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
Note: ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 1.8 presents the regression results. As one can see, the results are consistent
with our earlier results from the Markov chain model. In particular, both the most recent
and cumulative experience significantly affect choices, which we observed in Tables
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1.1 and 1.2. Additionally, in the “Qual-info” columns, it appears as though positive
quality-based information on the High-firm itself (or negative quality-based information
on the Low-firm) significantly encourages people to choose the High-firm, especially
under large-gap competition (see the significant coefficients of QualityIn f o1i,t−1 and
QualityIn f o2i,t−1). However, in terms of share-based information, the effects of this
type of SI are not significant. In sum, both of these results, with respect to the types of
SI and their impact on choices, are consistent with our earlier estimations in our Markov
model.
1.5.2 Treatment with Both Types of Social Information
While our objective in this work is to take a first step towards understanding how differ-
ent types of SI affect consumer choices and firms’ demand characteristics, we also ran
an additional experimental session which provided both share-based and quality-based
information to subjects under large-gap competition, which we refer to as “full informa-
tion.” While we omit the detailed results for brevity, our data from this treatment suggest
that consumers having access to full information behave very similar to those with only
quality-based information. For instance, the average market share of the High-firm is
85.7% under this full-info treatment, which is almost identical to the market share of
85.6% in the quality-based information treatment. Furthermore, we also observe that
the switching behavior of subjects under full information resembles the behavior of
subjects under only quality-based information. For example, the average number of
choices deviating from Bayesian choices under full information is close to the number
in the quality-based information treatment: under large-gap competition, subjects devi-
ate from Bayesian choices 5.7 times in the quality-based information treatment, and 6.1
times in the full information treatment over 40 periods.
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Table 1.9: Average of subjects’ elicited estimate of service quality (%) for the
High and Low-firm
Competition treatment SI treatment
Ei(qˆ1) Ei(qˆ2)
(RMSE(qˆ1)) (RMSE(qˆ2))
(Control)
73.9% 51.7%
(12.3%) (15.2%)
Share-based Info
75.3% 45.1%
Large-gap (11.2%) (20.6%)
(q1, q2) = (0.8, 0.5)
Quality-based Info
78.3% 48.9%
(6.1%) (17.9%)
Full-info∗
75.3% 50.0%
(11.4%) (19.8%)
(Control)
56.8% 50.2%
(16.6%) (15.7%)
Small-gap
Share-based Info
59.5% 45.3%
(q1, q2) = (0.55, 0.5) (16.2%) (15.0%)
Quality-based Info
54.1% 56.2%
(15.6%) (12.5%)
Note: ∗Number of subjects under Full-info treatment was 18.
The results from the full information treatment suggest that even when both dimen-
sions of SI are available to a firm, firms should make strategic decisions in which social
information to disclose, since quality-based information appears to potentially crowd
out the effect of share-based information. For instance, consider the case where the
firm can promote both types of information. When the quality gap between the com-
petitors is large, the Low-firm can benefit from promoting share-based information, but
should not try to reveal the true quality level at the same time. More specifically, pos-
itive share-based information promotes consumers to visit the Low-firm, providing a
short-term benefit in increased market share. However, when quality-based information
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is displayed to consumers at the same time (i.e. full information), consumers quickly
learn to behave like Bayesian decision makers and shift to the High-firm quickly.
Lastly, recall that, in all of our treatments, we asked subjects to state their belief on
the service quality of each firm at the end of each experiment. Their average elicited
belief is reported in Table 1.9. First, observe that subjects tend to have better estimates
of service quality, i.e., estimates (78.3% or 48.9% under large-gap) closer to the true q1
or q2, under quality-based information, with lower root mean squared error (RMSE) as
well. Also, no significant difference is present between the quality-based information
and full-info treatments, which suggests that quality-based information itself has high
informativeness. Overall, the elicited estimates by subjects under share-based informa-
tion treatment are the least accurate, which is consistent with the notion that share-based
information has reduced informativeness.
1.6 Conclusion
In this study, we investigate the impact of different types of social information on con-
sumers’ choices and firms’ demand characteristics. Unlike utility-based models under
social learning, our proposed Markov-chain based model assumes that consumers do not
go through a sophisticated utility evaluation process for available options. Instead, we
assume that consumers form their private beliefs about which firm is the ‘better’ option,
and visits the firm that seems more likely to give a satisfactory experience in the next
period, i.e., chooses a firm with higher likelihood of satisfaction. Therefore, our current
setting is directly applicable in the service industry where the outcomes of the service
quality are rather simple. For example, consumers tend to get either satisfaction (prob-
lem solved), or dissatisfaction (not solved), from visiting a doctor to hiring a plumber.
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Further, when consumers make repeated visits to such service providers, they may be
affected by social information.
Our experimental results yield a number of managerial implications. When the
quality gap between the competitors is large, promotion of quality-based information
is greatly beneficial for the firm with superior quality. In this setting, when provided
quality-based social information, consumers behave similar to Bayesian decision mak-
ers, so that the High-firm can dominate by achieving higher market share and profit.
Further, since the consumers quickly converge to the High-firm under quality-based in-
formation, both firms in the market can benefit from more accurate demand forecasting.
On the other hand, promoting share-based information is not necessarily favorable to
the High-firm, especially in the early periods. Instead, our data illustrate that the lower
quality firm can use share-based information to induce an early adoption of consumers
and achieve short-term benefits.
When the quality gap between the competitors is marginal, neither type of social
information can dramatically help consumers converge to one of the firms. However,
when a firm has marginally lower quality than its competitor, quality-based information
allows the firm to attract variety-seeking consumers, and portions the market share re-
flecting the true quality levels. This shows that the direction of market share bias under
quality-based information depends on the intensity of competition because consumers’
responsiveness to service quality differs based on their perceived quality gap between
competing firms. Conversely, a firm with marginally higher quality can do better with
intentional vagueness on quality, or promotion of share-based information. This is be-
cause the quality signal itself is not strong enough to differentiate the higher quality firm
from its competitors unless it exerts effort to decrease the noise in social information.
Particularly, share-based information promotes over-switching and decreases the num-
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ber of loyal consumers, thus, it can play a role to increase the market share, especially
when the difference in quality ratings is hard to distinguish. Considering that our share-
based information treatment creates a natural environment where people can see what
others do, but not know what they know, firms can use the idea of ‘information cascade’
to attempt to get a ‘visit cascade’ in a new service initiation.7 If the firm can attract an
initial set of consumers with share-based information, then those who make decisions
later may also try visiting the firm even if its quality is no better than its competitor
[26, 65]. Thus, for firms whose service quality is the key factor for competition, our
work can help guide their information disclosure policies (through which types of social
information to promote), better demand forecasting, and improved capacity planning de-
cisions. A summary of some of these implications regarding different social information
and their affect on firm performance is provided in Table 1.10.
Table 1.10: SI promotion strategy recommended to the firms with different quality
in competition
Competition level Large-gap Small-gap
High-firm Quality-based Info Share-based Info
(significant benefit) (benefit from cascade)
Low-firm Share-based Info Quality-based Info
(short-term benefit) (insignificant impact)
7From Banerjee [6], people pay attention to external information because they think others’ decisions
may reflect information that they do not have. This can happen especially when there is high uncertainty
in private information. The consequence is that people follow what everyone else is doing, even when
their private information suggests doing something quite different, and this is called information cascade.
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1.7 Appendices
1.7.1 Technical Details in Bayesian and WSLS Benchmark
We find Equation (1.5) useful to represent the heterogeneity in consumers’ information
utilization by varying the values of At and α. Also, we note that one can apply this visit
choice probability to s ∈ N firms competing, where the consumers have complex sets of
valuation structure. In such case, the generalized state space S = {(At,Rt) | 1 ≤ t ≤ T }
for some T ∈ N is defined to capture the consumer’s belief status. Then, At can be
any function of the consumer’s entire history of service experiences, measurable on
σ(V1,V2, ...,Vt, X1, ..., Xt), and Rt can be a function of the consumer’s recent service ex-
periences, measurable on σ(Y1t, ...,Yst). The state space S can have varying dimensions
to represent different types of choice rules as in Gans et al. [30]. If we let α fixed over
time as in our model, and assume that At is equal to A(t−1) in a recursive manner, it
becomes an exponentially discounted memory model as in Park et al. [60]. Or, if we
want to incorporate a Bayesian updating scheme, we impose α = 0 and At = I{νst≥νs′t},
where the valuation νst is updated and recalculated with all historical outcomes (e.g.,
[75], [31]). Another extreme example could be the myopic decision maker who only
considers the most recent experience with α = 1. In such case, we can think of the
Win-Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS) benchmark. Further details on the how we bench-marked
Bayesian and WSLS consumers are described in the following.
Bayesian Consumer Benchmark
Let the service outcomes from firm s at time t Xst for s = 1, 2, be sampled from the
true service quality level of each firm, i.e., X1t ∼ Ber(q1), X2t ∼ Ber(q2). Assume that
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a consumer chose k times to visit firm 1, and t − k times to visit firm 2 until time
t. Then, her accumulated satisfaction from the firm 1,
∑k
j=1 X1t j , follows Binom(k, q1)
and her accumulated satisfaction from the firm 2,
∑t−k
j=1 X2t j , follows Binom(t − k, q2).
Since the Beta distribution is conjugate for Binomial probability mass function, if a
consumer updates the posterior distribution of qs with Bayes rule, the posterior has the
same distributional family form with its prior [31]. Assume that the initial prior of
the service quality of firm s, qˆs0, is drawn from the Uniform distribution on [0,1], i.e.,
Beta(1, 1) for both firms. At the end of time t, the updated estimate of service quality
of the firm 1, qˆ1t, is assigned with Beta(1 +
∑k
j=1 X1t j , 1 + k −
∑k
j=1 X1t j) distribution,
with the initial prior Beta(1,1). Note that
∑k
j=1 X1t j corresponds to the number of total
satisfaction experienced from firm 1 up to time t, and k − ∑kj=1 X1t j is the number of
dissatisfaction experienced from firm 1 up to time t. Likewise, the updated estimate of
service quality for firm 2, qˆ2t, is assigned with Beta(1 +
∑t−k
j=1 X2t j , 1 + (t − k)−
∑t−k
j=1 X2t j)
distribution. Hence, if a consumer updates her service quality estimate in this Bayesian
manner, she obtains a unique posterior estimate of service quality qˆst for each firm s
at the end of every period t. Then, she uses the expectation of posterior probability of
getting satisfaction from each firm as the valuation of the firm νst, i.e.,
ν1t = E(qˆ1t) =
1 +
∑k
j=1 X1t j
2 + k
, ν2t = E(qˆ2t) =
1 +
∑t−k
j=1 X2t j
2 + t − k . (1.6)
Each time, the expectations of service quality estimate on both firms are updated in this
manner, and a consumer chooses the firm with highest expected reward to maximize her
utility. Therefore, a Bayesian consumer under this setting chooses the firm with higher
νst among the two firms every time t.
Bayesian benchmark choice paths generation Without SI, assume that a consumer
can explore both firms infinitely often. Then, by the Law of Large Numbers, the long-
run expected value of posterior estimate of service quality of firm s in Equation (1)
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becomes
lim
k→∞
E(qˆ1t) = q1, lim
(t−k)→∞
E(qˆ2t) = q2. (1.7)
Thus, if infinite explorations to both firms is possible for all satisfaction-maximizing
consumers, the long-run market share eventually should become dominated by the firm
with higher quality, qs. However, when a Bayesian consumer keeps choosing a firm
s = arg maxs∈1,2 E(qˆst) for all t, the challenge is to guarantee that she explores both of
the firms ‘often’ enough, i.e., with large enough k and t−k until time t, to obtain an accu-
rate enough estimate. Because of this so-called “exploration-exploitation dilemma” in
sequential choices [70, 32], we face a challenge that many individual Bayesian choices
we generated fail to choose the firm with higher-quality consistently.
Note that given our assumptions on the initial prior, the subsequent decision rule of
selecting the firm with the highest expected reward is equivalent to the Gittin’s index
policy, which is known to be an optimal policy for the multi-armed bandit problem. The
Gittin’s index measures the reward that can be achieved by a random process bearing a
termination state and evolving from its present state onward. In our (simple) special case
of a two-armed Bernoulli bandit problem, the Bayesian choice paths that successively
choosing the firm with higher posterior estimate of service quality can be considered
optimal to a reasonable extent [18].Therefore, we first collect what actual subjects ex-
perienced in our laboratory experiments. Then, based on their observations from every
visit, we generate the Bayesian benchmark choice paths ex post. This is because our
intent of developing this Bayesian benchmark path is to see how and when a consumer
deviates from the choice that maximizes her expected reward. Thus, a Bayesian con-
sumer in our model follows a choice path selecting the firm with the highest expected
service quality each time, based on what corresponding subject observed through her
own visits in the experiment. After generating the individual choice path of a Bayesian
consumer, we aggregate and average the individual paths to generate the ‘Bayesian mar-
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ket share path.’
WSLS Consumer Benchmark
Under the WSLS setting, if a consumer i is satisfied at her visit of firm s at time t,
she chooses the firm s again at time t + 1; otherwise, she switches to firm s′(, s) with
probability = 1. This immediate response to service failure allows our original Markov
chain collapses with two states defined solely based on a consumer’s visit choice as
Xt =
 1, if a consumer visits store 1 at time t2, if a consumer visits store 2 at time t (1.8)
and the transition probability is given as P =
 p11 p12p21 p22
 =
 q1 1 − q11 − q2 q2
.
Then, the long-run market share of two competing firms with WSLS consumers become
pi1 = lim
t→∞ P(Xt = 1) =
1 − q2
(1 − q1) + (1 − q2) , pi2 = limt→∞ P(Xt = 2) =
1 − q1
(1 − q1) + (1 − q2)
(1.9)
WSLS benchmark choice paths generation To generate one-to-one comparable indi-
vidual benchmark paths for an experimental data, we again use the same fixed set of
service outcomes designed for the experiment. Then, we start from the initial choice of
the subjects and generate individual choice paths by WSLS consumers, and aggregate
and average the individual choice paths to generate the ‘WSLS market share path’.
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1.7.2 Technical Details on Convergence Speed Test
We build the Markov chain to test the demand predictability, by incorporating the
first-order auto-regressive relationship (AR(1)) of each consumer’s most recent experi-
ence and the choice of the following period. This simpler setting where we only take
into account the most recent experience allows us to compare how human behavior gets
closer to Bayesian or WSLS consumers under SI. We represent a consumer’s most re-
cent visit and experience with four states, S = {1S , 1D, 2S , 2D}. The first number in
each state denotes which firm a consumer chooses to visit, indicating the High-firm as 1
and the Low-firm as 2. The second letter denotes whether a consumer is satisfied(S) or
dissatisfied(D) at her latest service encounter of that firm.
In the general theory of convergence of transition matrix P with 0 < ai, j < 1, one of
the indicators on how fast P converges to its steady-state is to look into its eigenvalues.
As we have an irreducible, aperiodic, and regular Markov Chain on the finite state space
S , there exist stationary distribution, s.t. pi = piP, where limt→∞ P
(t)
i j = pi j, ∀i, j ∈ S ,
and the convergence speed of Pn to pi is dominated by the size of second-largest eigen-
value, λ2, of each transition matrix. This can be an indicator of how quickly the switch-
ing probability, i.e. likelihood of switching in response to the most recent experience,
becomes stabilized over time. Our estimated P ∈ R4×4 had all positive entries, under dif-
ferent treatments. This makes the Markov chain regular, and then, has a unique largest
eigenvalue λ1 = 1, because all row sums of the transition matrices P are 1. See Perron-
Frobenius theory in Behrends [8] for details. Then, there exists a unique distribution
vector pi such that piP = pi.
Since all eigenvalues of P, λ1, ..., λ4, are real and distinct, we know that by eigenvalue
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decomposition, ∃ invertible U, s.t.
U · P · U−1 = Λ =

λ1 0 . . . 0
0 λ2 0
...
. . . 0
0 0 . . . λ4

.
In this case, U−1 = V are precisely the right eigenvectors corresponding to the eigen-
values λ1, ..., λ4.
Pn = V · Λn · UT =
4∑
i=1
λni viu
T
i
|Pn − λn1v1uT1 | ≤ |
4∑
i=1
λni viu
T
i | ≤
4∑
i=2
|λni ||vi||uTi |
Since P has a unique largest eigenvalue λ1 = 1 and the other eigenvalues can also be
ordered so that 1 = λ1 > |λ2| ≥ . . . ≥ |λn|, when n→ ∞,
Pn = V

1 . . . 0
0 λn2 . . . 0
...
. . . 0
0 0 . . . λn4

UT = V

1 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0
...
. . . 0
0 0 . . . 0

UT =

v11u1
v12u1
...
v14u1

=

pi
pi
pi
pi

The second last equation holds because the unique left eigenvector associated to
eigenvalue 1 is the stationary distribution pi, and the corresponding unique right eigen-
vector is 1 = (1, 1, 1, 1) up to normalization. If the first row of U is normalized to pi,
then the first column of V must be normalized to 1 because UV = UU−1 = I, and
(UV)11 = u1v1 = piv1 = 1. Hence, if we let Π =

pi
pi
pi
pi

,
∃ positive M s.t. |Pn − Π| ≤ (∑4i=2 |vi||uTi |)|λ2|n ≤ (n − 1) · 1 · 1T · |λ2|n = M · |λ2|n
Thus, Pn = Π+O(|λ2|n), and the convergence speed of Pn is dominated by the size of λ2.
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Figure 1.7: Bootstrapped probability distribution of second-largest eigenvalues of
estimated transition matrices: Solid lines are from the transition ma-
trices estimated using the first 15 periods, dashed lines are from the
transition matrices estimated using the latter 25 periods.
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This result is further supported by Boyd et al. [17], where they show that the Markov
chain reaches its equilibrium faster with the smaller SLEM (Second Largest Eigenvalue
Modulus), which is defined by max {λ2,−λn}. This quantity is widely used to bound the
asymptotic convergence rate of the Markov chain to its stationary distribution. Since
we noticed that the learning speed of the first and the latter half of the experiment are
distinct from each other, we partitioned the first 15 periods and latter 25 periods of data
and used them separately. Then, we captured the convergence speed, i.e., measured
second-largest eigenvalues (SLE), of the transition probability under both time blocks
to see how the learning speed under different SI treatment evolves.
Figure 1.7 shows the bootstrapped probability distributions of estimated SLEs of
transition matrices under all six treatments. Note that horizontal axis represents the SLE
values. We had different transition probabilities P estimated under different treatments,
and therefore different convergence speeds to equilibrium. Again, a smaller second-
largest eigenvalue implies faster convergence to stability. Learning speed under the
share-based info treatment does not significantly vary in early and later periods of time;
49
however, note that SLEs of estimated transition matrices under quality-based informa-
tion treatment are significantly lower, implying faster convergence to the stable status.
Since fast convergence to equilibrium occurs in the early periods, i.e., quick learning,
under quality-based information, the convergence speed is estimated to be slower in the
latter periods.
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CHAPTER 2
PREDICTING ORDER VARIABILITY IN INVENTORY DECISIONS: A
MODEL OF FORECAST ANCHORING
2.1 Introduction
A prevalent supply chain phenomenon, known as the bullwhip effect, is that demand
variability tends to amplify as it propagates from a downstream stage to an upstream
stage [44]. Amplified demand variability can lead to excessive inventory investment,
poor customer service, and lost revenues for companies. For instance, a recent study
suggests that the suppliers of consumer packaged goods hold an excessive 42 days of
average inventory on hand [71], which is largely due to the order volatility coming from
downstream buyers. In addition, in the automotive industry, upstream suppliers can be
fined up to $4,000 per minute if they fail to provide a component/product and cause
production downtime1. Excessive order variability of the bullwhip effect can be a result
of rational decision making with limited information in a decentralized supply chain
[44], but it can also be a result of human decision errors such as under-reaction to lead
time, over-stocking to avoid potential supply shortage, and mis-accounting for inventory
carryover/backorders [24, 25, 12].2
In this chapter, we seek to reveal further insight into the behavioral causes of the
excessive order variability by isolating the effects of lead time, supply shortage, and
inventory carryover/backorders. To this end, we consider a multi-period newsvendor
problem with stationary demand and constant cost parameters, where lead time, supply
shortage, and inventory carryover/backorders do not play a role in one’s order decisions.
1Refer to the archived article on March 10, 2016 from https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevebanker.
2Recent developments in the study of the bullwhip effect can be found in a comprehensive review by
Chen and Lee [19].
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For such a problem, a rational decision maker would order at a constant level across
periods, and the resulting order variability would be zero. Yet, a number of experiments
(e.g., [64, 13]) have shown that human decision makers not only deviate from the profit-
maximizing order quantity in average orders, but also exhibit significant order variability
from period to period.
A number of behavioral models have been proposed to explain and predict the devi-
ation in mean order quantities (e.g., [38, 56]), but few exist to predict the variability of
order quantities. In fact, the observed order variability is often simply left as unexplain-
able residual noise. For example, Ho et al. [38] assume and estimate the order variability
as a form of treatment-specific residual noise (p. 1900), which does not have predictive
power across treatments. In this chapter, we develop a behavioral model that can predict
both the mean and variability of order quantities.
Our model, referred to as the forecast anchoring model, is a generalization of the
mean anchoring model suggested by Schweitzer and Cachon [64]. As the name indi-
cates, it is based on the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic [41]. Specifically, we posit
that human decision makers anchor their order decisions on the (random) point forecast
instead of the (constant) mean demand in each period. In the multi-period newsvendor
problem, the decision maker is primed to make sequential demand forecasts from pe-
riod to period. It is known that human subjects may fall victim to probability matching
for such a task with binary predictions [73]. We build on this behavioral tendency by
assuming that the point forecast mentally drawn by the decision maker in each period
follows a certain distribution, according to the simulation heuristic [41]. Therefore, the
random point forecast represents a possible cause for order variability. In addition, rec-
ognizing possible individual heterogeneity in employing the anchoring-and-adjustment
heuristic, we further assume that the heuristic adjustment level in each period could also
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vary, representing another possible cause of order variability.
In summary, we model the newsvendor decision as a two-step process: subjects
first mentally draw a demand forecast as an anchor point and then adjust toward the
profit-maximizing quantity to arrive at the order decision. Under this model framework,
we derive formulas for the mean and variance of order quantities for estimation and
prediction purposes. As a result, the order variability prediction is parameterized under
the forecast anchoring model.
To test and validate our forecast anchoring model, we obtain data from two past
newsvendor experiments: Bolton and Katok [13] and Ockenfels and Selten [56]. The
study of Bolton and Katok [13] is also used in the estimation of the bounded rationality
model of Su [68]. Among the existing models that focus on predicting newsvendor
behavior, Su’s (2008) model is particularly relevant to our study, as it is the only one, to
our knowledge, that provides the prediction formulas for the mean and variance of order
quantities. With the same data set, we utilize his bounded rationality model estimates as
an important benchmark for our forecast anchoring model. The data set from Ockenfels
and Selten [56] is a rich one as it consists of 11 different critical fractile conditions. We
use it for cross-study out-of-sample testing to further validate our model.
We first apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) to generate parameters
of our forecast anchoring model and fit them to the data set of [13]. We then compare
these results to the bounded rationality model predictions and observe that the forecast
anchoring model yields significant improvements (see Figure 2.1 in §2.4). The bounded
rationality model is found to bias the mean order estimate toward the optimal quantity
and also overestimate the order variability. To further validate our model, we take our
model estimates from the [13] data, and use them to generate predictions for ordering
decisions in the data set from [56]. We evaluate how these cross-study out-of-sample
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forecasts compare to actual decisions, and find that they predict both mean and variabil-
ity of order quantities well in the high critical fractile conditions, but with a moderate
bias in the low critical fractile conditions. We hypothesize that this is due to a shift in
demand distributions (by design) across the two studies under these conditions, and sub-
sequently show that this bias goes away when fitting the forecast anchoring model with
the (pooled) within-study data from [56]. This within-study estimation further demon-
strates that our model can predict the mean and variability of order quantities well for
specific critical fractile conditions, even with parameters estimated from data pooled
across different critical fractile conditions (which is not possible with the existing mod-
els, such as [38]).
We further demonstrate that our model is flexible enough to fit the individual order
behavior using the data from [13] and [56]. We find that most subjects do not exhibit
variability in their adjustment levels across periods, but the adjustment level differs sig-
nificantly across subjects. This explains why we need to account for variable adjustment
levels in cross-subject estimates.
The two experimental data sets used in our model validation are based on a continu-
ous, uniform demand distribution, which is symmetric around the mean demand. Such
symmetric demand distributions (e.g., the uniform or normal distribution) have been
used in a vast majority of previous experimental newsvendor studies. To determine
whether our forecast anchoring model is robust in settings beyond these distributions,
we investigate the order behavior in the context with asymmetric two-point demand (the
same as the binary prediction game studied in the probability matching literature). We
conduct our own experiments and continue to observe that the forecast anchoring model
predicts the mean and variability of order quantities well. Moreover, this asymmetric
two-point demand experimental study enables us to test the validity of alternative mod-
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els, such as utility-based models and other anchoring models. Interestingly, we find that
these alternative models are not robust enough to fit the data in this unique setting.
Across the different data sets (i.e., [13], [56], and our own two-point demand ex-
periments), we find a consistent pattern that subjects tend to anchor heavily on their
demand forecast when the newsvendor critical fractile is high (that is, when the product
profit margin is 50% or more). This finding suggests that managers need to pay extra
attention to the forecast anchoring tendency in high profit margin products. Overall, our
forecast anchoring model provides a new perspective for explaining and predicting or-
der variability observed in behavioral inventory decisions. From our study, we identify
random point forecasts and variable adjustment levels as two possible causes of exces-
sive order variability. Specifically, the main cause of order variability at the individual
level is random point forecasts across periods. Nevertheless, the order variability at the
aggregate level is driven by both random point forecasts and variable adjustment levels
across individual decision makers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we begin by presenting a sum-
mary of the relevant literature in §2.2. In §2.3 we provide the theoretical details of our
forecast anchoring model for continuous demand. Following this, in §2.4, we validate
the model through a series of estimations and predictions. In §??, we further check the
robustness of the model under a setting with discrete, asymmetric demand. Finally, §2.5
provides a conclusion and managerial implications from our study.
2.2 Literature Review
Behavioral operations management investigates how human decision makers act in op-
erational settings, and attempts to understand what behavioral biases may account for
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any observed outcomes. Within this field, a considerable amount of attention has been
spent on the newsvendor problem. The seminal experimental paper on this topic is
Schweitzer and Cachon [64], where they observe that order quantities deviate from the
normative predictions in two key ways. First, decision makers exhibit a pull-to-center
effect, in that mean order quantities are between the mean of the demand distribution and
the normative prediction. Second, there is a considerable amount of variability in order
quantities from period to period, despite all price, cost, and demand parameters remain-
ing constant. A number of studies have subsequently illustrated the robustness of these
two results. For instance, they have been shown to persist with additional decisions,
more feedback relating to foregone options, higher payoffs, lower decision frequency,
multi-location correlation, experienced managers, mental accounting, and task decom-
position [13, 15, 49, 38, 14, 20, 45]. For a summary of the experimental literature on
the newsvendor, please see the work of Becker-Peth and Thonemann [7] and references
therein.
With respect to the first anomaly, the pull-to-center effect for mean orders, re-
searchers have identified a number of behavioral models that can account for it, which
generally follow one of three approaches. The first, broadly speaking, relies on a more
traditional expected utility (or expected profit) approach. For instance, Schweitzer and
Cachon [64] posit that decision makers may attempt to minimize ex post inventory re-
gret. In their model, they assume that a newsvendor’s expected utility function is com-
prised of the standard expected profit function, plus a disutility term which is increasing
in the absolute deviation between the observed demand and order quantity. In another
study, Ho et al. [38], extend this ex post inventory regret model by incorporating refer-
ence dependence. That is, they assume that the newsvendor’s expected utility function
is the standard expected profit function plus two disutility terms, one which is increas-
ing in the number of units stocked above actual demand, and one which is increasing in
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the number of units stocked below actual demand. Ockenfels and Selten [56] develop
an impulse-balanced equilibrium (IBE) concept for predicting mean order quantities,
by proposing an expected utility function that relies on the empirical observation that
people tend to weight losses roughly twice that of gains. Lastly, Long and Nasiry [48]
demonstrate that prospect theory can account for mean newsvendor orders when the
reference point is not a payoff of zero.3
Still within this first category, there are papers which also assume that people are
biased in developing a demand distribution, to which they then apply the standard criti-
cal fractile solution (which is based on maximizing expected profit). For example, Ren
and Croson [62] propose that decision makers underestimate the variance of the forecast
distribution (i.e. exhibit overconfidence), which is then used in conjunction with the
standard critical fractile solution, and find that it can explain mean orders well. Simi-
larly, Tong and Feiler [72] claim that bounded cognition and representativeness, which
states that a decision maker relies on a small sample of outcomes and that this sam-
ple is representative of the population, can also bias a newsvendor’s estimated demand
distribution and lead to ordering decisions that coincide with the pull-to-center effect.
Another perspective regarding the biases in developing a demand distribution is the ten-
dency of overreacting to forecast errors in time-series forecasts. For instance, Kremer
et al. [42] find that people overreact to forecast errors in relatively stable time series,
but underreact to errors in relatively unstable time series. In most newsvendor experi-
ments including the ones we analyze here, however, the demand distribution is a simple
uniform distribution, and the demand chasing behavior is found to be largely negligible
[64]. For this reason, we assume that people’s point forecast is drawn from the same
uniform distribution as the demand.
3Note that, technically, prospect theory uses a “value” function, but this value function is essentially
the same as the expected utility approach of models like Ho et al. [38], in that the value function is
comprised of the standard expected profit function, in addition to some additional terms which account
for biases such as loss aversion and reference dependence.
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The second approach to explain the pull-to-center effect is to assume that a deci-
sion maker’s utility evaluation is subject to random (Gumbel) noise.4 [68] proposes
this framework for the newsvendor problem, demonstrating that a newsvendor may not
always select the expected-profit maximizing quantity, but instead, choose better order
quantities more often. He then illustrates that it fits the data better than the norma-
tive prediction. [15] also incorporate random utility into their model, combined with a
memory and reinforcement bias, and show that it too coincides well with mean order
quantities.
The third way to account for the pull-to-center effect for mean order quantities relies
on decision heuristics. For example, Schweitzer and Cachon [64] mention that anchor-
ing and insufficient adjustment can explain mean orders. In particular, they hypothesize
that a decision maker may select an anchor for their quantity and then adjust away from
this, where there are two likely anchors in the newsvendor problem, mean demand or
demand in the prior period. Our forecast anchoring model is a generalization of the
mean anchoring model, where we assume the anchor is the random point forecast in
each period.
In short, we contributes to this rich literature by developing a model that can ac-
curately predict the mean and variability of order quantities as well as help identify
possible behavioral causes for excessive order variability.
4[50] propose such a random utility model for normal form games (termed the “quantal response
equilibrium”) and apply it to various experimental game data. Successful applications of the model have
been reported in coordination games [4], auction games [34], pricing contracts [46, 37], newsvendor
experiments [68], and capacity allocation games [21].
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2.3 Forecast Anchoring Model
Consider a newsvendor problem for a single product. The demand in a period, denoted
by D, is a random draw from a probability distribution. Let f (·) denote the demand
distribution density and F(·) be the cumulative distribution function. Let [a, b] be the
support of the demand distribution (a = −∞ and b = ∞ if the demand follows a normal
distribution). Let m = E{D} denote the mean demand. The demand across different
periods is independent and identically-distributed (i.i.d.).
The unit purchase cost for the product is c and the unit selling price is p, with 0 <
c < p. The unit salvage value for any leftover inventory is assumed to be zero. It can be
shown that the order quantity that maximizes the expected profit is
q∗ = F−1
(
p − c
p
)
, (2.1)
where F−1(·) is the inverse function of F(·). The ratio γ = (p−c)/p is commonly referred
to as the critical fractile in the newsvendor problem. Following the convention in the
literature, we use q∗ as our normative benchmark.
When a human decision maker attempts to make repeated order decisions for the
newsvendor problem under i.i.d. demand, we posit that she would start her decision
process by first forecasting the demand in a period. The demand forecast is then used as
a decision anchor, based on which she adjusts her order quantity in the direction toward
the normative benchmark. Thus, the decision process consists of two stages: the first
stage involves demand forecast generation, and the second stage involves an anchoring-
and-adjustment heuristic to arrive at the final order decision.
Suppose that a point forecast for demand, denoted by X, is mentally drawn by the
decision maker in a period. Assume that X is i.i.d. and follows a distribution with density
g(x). It is quite plausible that g(·) ≡ f (·), that is, the demand forecast is drawn from
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the same demand distribution f (·). For example, when the demand distribution is a
two-point distribution, the well-documented probability matching tendency in human
judgment [73] implies g(·) ≡ f (·). In general, however, g(·) may be different from
f (·), as there could be errors and noise when an individual mentally draws a random
sample from a, potentially complex, demand distribution. Nevertheless, it is reasonable
to assume that g(·) is statistically close to f (·). For example, if the decision maker knows
the mean of the demand distribution, it is reasonable to assume that the mean of the point
forecast would be the same as the mean of demand, i.e., E{X} = E{D} = m. In other
words, the point forecast is unbiased, which we shall assume throughout the chapter.5
Given a random point forecast X = x in a period, we assume that the decision maker
anchors on the point forecast and then adjusts in the direction toward the normative
benchmark to reach the final order decision Q [41]. Specifically, the heuristic can be
written as
Q = x + Λ(q∗ − x), (2.2)
where q∗ is the target for adjustment and Λ is the level of adjustment from the forecast
anchor x toward the target. For generality, we assume that Λ is a random variable with
mean and variance given by
E{Λ} = λ, var{Λ} = σ2Λ.
The noise around the adjustment level captures the decision maker’s cognitive limitation
in precisely determining the magnitude of adjustment. When the decision maker uses a
constant adjustment level, we have σΛ = 0.
Given the above heuristic specification (2.2), we can derive the following conditional
5Note that we assume that the decision maker is informed of the underlying demand distribution,
which is the case in most experimental newsvendor studies such as [13] and [56]. When this information
is not available, there may exist biases in the decision maker’s point forecast due to the loss function pull
[45].
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expectation and variance expressions:
E{Q|X = x} = x + λ(q∗ − x),
var{Q|X = x} = (q∗ − x)2σ2Λ.
Thus, we can obtain the unconditional expected order quantity as follows:
E{Q} = E{E{Q|X}} = m + λ(q∗ − m), (2.3)
where, as mentioned previously, we use the assumption that the demand forecast is
unbiased, i.e., E{X} = E{D} = m. We note that the above mean order prediction is
the same as those from the mean anchoring models [64, 13, 15]. Nevertheless, our
forecast anchoring model can further predict the order variance. Following the law of
total variance, we have
var{Q} = E{var{Q|X}} + var{E{Q|X}}
=
[
(q∗ − m)2 + var{X}
]
σ2Λ + (1 − λ)2var{X}. (2.4)
where var{X} depends on the forecast distribution g(x) in general (not necessarily the
same as the demand distribution).
To summarize, our forecast anchoring model builds on two well-documented psy-
chological effects: the probability matching behavior in sequential predictions [73] and
the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic [41]. Because the model relies on pure decision
heuristics, there is no need to assume the decision maker capable of evaluating a non-
trivial newsvendor profit and/or utility function on the fly. The model can be used to
predict not only the mean but also the variance of order quantities, and can also help
identify possible causes of excessive order variability in inventory decisions.
61
2.4 Model Estimation and Validation
In this section we test and validate our model through the use of two external newsvendor
experimental data sets from [13] and [56]. For ease of reference, we shall refer to Bolton
and Katok [13] as “BK,” and Ockenfels and Selten [56] as “OS.” In the BK data, the
observed variances of order quantities are 289.71 in the low critical fractile condition,
and 341.06 in the high critical fractile condition. In the OS data, the observed variance
of the order quantities range from 114.67 to 377.40 (for the critical fractile conditions
from 0.1 to 0.9). In short, the observed order variances are all significantly greater than
the normative prediction of zero.
We first estimate the parameters of our model using the BK data. We then take these
estimates and use them to generate predictions for the mean and standard deviation of
order quantities in the setting employed by OS, and compare the predictions to the OS
data. We also fit individual order decisions in both data sets.
2.4.1 Parameter Estimation
Both BK and OS uses the uniform demand distribution in their studies. Below we
first derive our forecast anchoring model predictions under this distribution. Given that
the demand distribution is uniformly distributed in [a, b], the mean demand and the
normative benchmark order quantity are given by
m =
b − a
2
, q∗ = a + (b − a)γ,
where γ = (p − c)/p is the critical fractile.
Because the uniform distribution is relatively intuitive, we assume that the point
forecast distribution g(·) is the same as the demand distribution for simplicity, i.e., g(x) =
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1/(b − a) over [a, b].6 Plugging the uniform density function into (2.3) and (2.4), we
obtain
E{Q} = m + λ(q∗ − m), (2.5)
var{Q} =
[
(q∗ − m)2 + (b − a)
2
12
]
σ2Λ +
(b − a)2
12
(1 − λ)2. (2.6)
We shall use the above two prediction equations to estimate the parameters of our fore-
cast anchoring model.
In the experiment of BK, under the high critical fractile condition (γ = 0.75), the
demand distribution is uniformly distributed between [0, 100], with an optimal order
quantity q∗ = 75. Under the low critical fractile condition (γ = 0.25), the demand
distribution is uniformly distributed between [50, 150], with an optimal order quantity
q∗ = 75. Thus, equations (2.5) and (2.6) give the predictions of the mean and variance
of order quantity for each period. Specifically, the expected order quantities of each
critical fractile condition are
E{Q}(γ=0.75) = 50 + 25λ,
E{Q}(γ=0.25) = 100 − 25λ,
and the variance is identical for both conditions:
var{Q}(γ=0.75) = var{Q}(γ=0.25) =
(
252 +
1002
12
)
σ2Λ +
1002
12
(1 − λ)2.
We use the order quantities across subjects in each of the 100 rounds from BK to
calculate the sample mean and standard deviation. Based on these 100 observations
of each of the two moments, we estimate the model parameters λ and σΛ by applying
the iterative GMM method [36]. The GMM iteration is terminated when the successive
6A more precise approach is to use an empirically estimated forecast distribution for f (x), which is
not available from the BK and OS data sets.
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estimate differences are less than 0.005 for both parameters. We choose the iterative
GMM method because the resulting estimates are invariant with respect to the scale of
the data and to the initial weighting matrix [35].
Table 2.1: Estimated Parameters and Prediction Results for the BK Data
Observation Model
Critical Fractile Parameter Estimates from the Data Prediction
Condition λ σΛ Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
γ = 0.75 0.43 (0.001) 0.20 (0.001) 60.76 18.47 60.76 18.13
γ = 0.25 0.49 (0.001) 0.21 (0.003) 87.81 17.02 87.77 16.72
Note: Standard errors of the estimated parameters are in the parentheses.
The estimation results as well as the predictions of the mean and standard deviation
of order quantities are reported in Table 2.1.7 From the table, the estimated parameters
of λ and σΛ are similar under both critical fractile conditions, with the level of adjust-
ment from the forecast anchor x to the normative benchmark q∗ being lower under the
high critical fractile condition (λ(γ=0.75) = 0.43 < λ(γ=0.25) = 0.49). The adjustment to-
ward the normative benchmark is clearly insufficient under both conditions: the average
level of adjustment stops short of half way toward the normative benchmark. Accord-
ing to our model specification in equation (2.2), lower adjustment level implies stronger
anchoring effect on the demand forecast. Thus, the results suggest that subjects tend
to anchor heavily on their demand forecast when the critical fractile is high. More-
over, there exists a significant amount of noise (estimates of σΛ) around the adjustment
level. This aggregate level variability in adjustment level can be a result of two potential
causes: the variable adjustment levels across periods of individual decision makers, or
7We also checked the robustness of the results by using the pooled sample mean and standard deviation
of each successive five periods and find the similar results.
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heterogeneous (constant) adjustment levels of individual decision makers. In §2.4.3, we
conduct an individual analysis to further test which cause is at work here.
Table 2.1 also shows that the forecast anchoring model predicts the mean and stan-
dard deviation of order quantities well. As a comparison, we note that the bounded
rationality (BR) model of Su [68] also predicts the mean and standard deviation of order
quantities. Because the same data set from BK is used in Su [68], we can compare the
bounded rationality model’s predictions of the mean and standard deviation with our
model’s predictions. According to Su [68], the order quantity under bounded rationality
follows a truncated normal distribution. Therefore, we take the estimates of τ in Table
2 of his paper (p. 576) for high and low critical fractile conditions of the BK study,
and plug them into the formula of a truncated normal distribution (p. 573) to obtain
predictions for the mean and standard deviation of order quantities. Figure 2.1 depicts
the predicted values from the BR model compared with our forecast anchoring (FA)
model predictions. As one can see, in Figure 2.1, the BR model estimates the mean
order quantity with a bias toward q∗ = 75 relative to the observed mean order quantity,
and over-estimates the standard deviation of the order quantity, whereas our forecast
anchoring model yields an accurate prediction of both metrics.
2.4.2 Cross-Study Out-of-Sample Validation
We now test how well the model parameter estimates obtained from the BK data can
predict the mean and standard deviation of order quantities in a separate newsvendor
experiment. To this end, Ockenfels and Selten [56] provide a rich data set for cross-
validation purposes. Specifically, their experiment is conducted under a uniform de-
mand distribution over [0, 100] with critical fractile levels γ = 0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 1 (the
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Figure 2.1: Observations from BK and Predictions by the Forecast Anchoring
(FA) and Bounded Rationality (BR) Models
corresponding q∗ = 0, 10, 20, ..., 100), and 200 rounds of decisions.8
To conduct this out-of-sample test, for the OS data with critical fractile greater than
or equal to 0.5, we generate the predictions of the mean and standard deviation of order
quantities using the parameters of the high critical fractile condition, (λ, σΛ)(γ=0.75) =
(0.43, 0.20), estimated from the BK data. For the OS data with critical fractile less
than 0.5, we generate the predictions using the parameters of the low critical fractile
condition, (λ, σΛ)(γ=0.25) = (0.49, 0.21), estimated from the BK data (see Table 2.1).
Thus, we provide a fairly rigorous cross-study test of the model.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the observed mean and standard deviation of order quantities
from the OS data as well as the forecast anchoring (FA) predictions based on the BK
estimates. In both plots, beginning with the high critical fractile cases (γ ≥ 0.5), the
parameters estimated from the BK condition γ = 0.75 generate fairly accurate predic-
8In reporting our cross-validation results, we omit the extreme cases with critical fractile being zero
and one.
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Figure 2.2: Cross-Study Out-of-Sample Validation: Mean (left) and Variability
(right) Fit of OS Data using the BK Estimates
tions for the mean and standard deviation of order quantities. However, turning to the
low fractile cases (γ < 0.5), some biases appear to exist in the predictions generated by
the parameters estimated from the BK condition γ = 0.25. Recall that in the condition
γ = 0.25 of the BK study, the demand range was shifted from [0, 100] to [50, 150],
so that the normative benchmark quantity was the same (q∗ = 75) across both critical
fractile conditions. In contrast, in the OS study the demand range is fixed at [0, 100] for
all critical fractile cases. Thus, the less accurate predictions in the low critical fractile
cases are likely due to the different demand ranges used in the BK and OS experiments,
which we further investigate below.
For comparison purposes, we estimate the model parameters directly based on the
200 rounds of the OS data. Let γ = 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9 be the critical fractile. With the
demand uniformly distributed over [0, 100], we have q∗ = 100γ. From (2.5) and (2.6),
we can derive the following estimation equations for the average and the variance of
order quantity for each period:
E{Q}γ = 50 + λ(100γ − 50),
var{Q}γ =
(
(100γ − 50)2 + 100
2
12
)
σ2Λ +
1002
12
(1 − λ)2.
67
Based on the above equations, we pool the data for conditions with γ ≥ 0.5 and again
use the iterative GMM method described earlier to estimate λ andσΛ for the high critical
fractile condition. We repeat the same procedure by pooling data with γ < 0.5 for the
low critical fractile condition. The estimation results from this exercise are shown in
Table 2.2. In addition, Figure 2.3 plots the observed mean and standard deviation of
order quantities from OS as well as the predictions based on the parameter estimates
shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Estimated Parameters of FA Model from Pooled OS Data using the OS
Estimates
Critical Fractile Parameter Estimates
Condition λ σΛ
γ = 0.5, ..., 0.9 (pooled) 0.53 (0.000) 0.29 (0.000)
γ = 0.1, ..., 0.4 (pooled) 0.76 (0.000) 0.26 (0.000)
Note: Standard errors of the estimated parameters are in the parentheses.
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Figure 2.3: Within-Study Validation of the Estimates: Mean (left) and Variability
(right) Fit of OS Data
From Figure 2.3, it is clear that the within-study predictions are more accurate than
the cross-study predictions shown in Figure 2.2 (note that the within-study predictions
are based on pooled data across different critical fractile conditions as shown in Table
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2.2). This is especially true in the low critical fractile cases, where the bias is no longer
present. Turning back to Table 2.2, it appears that the pattern of lower adjustment level
in high critical fractile cases is consistent with that observed in the BK data. Thus, the
OS data support the earlier finding that subjects tend to anchor heavily on their demand
forecast when the critical fractile is high. Moreover, the within-study estimate of λ is
significantly higher than the cross-study estimate of λ in the low critical fractile cases
(0.76 versus 0.49). This explains the prediction bias observed in Figure 2.2 and suggests
that the demand range may have an impact on the average adjustment levels. In addition,
the noise levels of σΛ are moderately higher in the within-study analysis, relative to the
BK estimates in Table 2.1. This is due to data pooling across the different critical fractile
conditions in the OS within-study estimation.
Finally, recall that Ockenfels and Selten [56] propose an IBE model that explains the
mean of order quantities observed in their data. The predicted mean by the IBE model
displays significant downward bias when the critical fractile is 0.5 (see Figure 1, [56] p.
240). Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show that the forecast anchoring model does not have such a
bias at critical fractile 0.5. In addition, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 demonstrate that our forecast
anchoring model has the ability to predict the order variability present in their data with
fairly reasonable accuracy both within and across studies.
2.4.3 Individual Heterogeneity
It is well-known that there is considerable heterogeneity in newsvendor experiments.
Therefore, in this section, we fit our model to individual order decisions, which effec-
tively captures the heterogeneity in each subject’s adjustment level. We use the order
quantities of each subject’s 20 rounds from both BK and OS to calculate the sample
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means and standard deviations of individual orders. Based on these within-subject level
observations of each of the two moments, we estimate the model parameters λ and σΛ
by applying the iterative GMM method for each subject.
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Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of subject-level estimates (along with the aggre-
gate estimate values from earlier estimations for reference). Although subjects from
both the BK and OS experiments display considerable heterogeneity, the distribution of
individual estimates display a similar pattern across both high and low critical fractile
conditions. The aggregate estimates, marked with thicker points in Figure 2.4, reflect the
distribution of individual estimates and capture the dispersion in individual adjustment
levels.
Note in Figure 2.4 that most individuals do not exhibit variability in Λ across periods,
while there is significant variability in Λ across subjects. Interestingly, at least two-
thirds of subjects in every condition have a constant adjustment level, i.e., σΛ=0. This
indicates that the main cause of order variability for many subjects is due to their random
point forecasts, rather than variable adjustment levels, and that their order quantities can
be fit parsimoniously using a single parameter λ. However, these individual λ values
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are considerably dispersed across subjects. This explains why we need to account for
variability in Λ in the aggregate level estimation. In summary, while the main cause of
order variability at the individual level is random point forecasts across periods, the order
variability at the aggregate level is driven by both random point forecasts and variable
adjustment levels across individual decision makers. Moreover, individual heterogeneity
in adjustment levels can largely account for the aggregate level variability in adjustment
level (σΛ) as hypothesized in §2.4.1, especially with the BK data shown in Figure 2.4
(a).
Figure 2.4 also shows that some subjects over-adjust their forecasts to q∗ (with λ >
1). This tendency is stronger under the low critical fractile conditions in both the BK
and OS data. In Figures 2.4 (a) and (b), subjects in the high critical fractile conditions
tend to have smaller λ than those in the low critical fractile conditions, suggesting that
more subjects anchor heavily on their demand forecast when the critical fractile is high.
This observation is consistent with the cross-subject aggregate level estimation results
reported earlier.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a forecast anchoring model that can predict the variability of
order quantities when the effects of lead time, inventory carryover/backorders, and the
four causes of the bullwhip effect [44] are isolated. In such a setting, a rational decision
maker should set a constant profit-maximizing order in every period. However, human
decision makers have been shown to set quantities in a way that exhibit considerable
order variability from period to period. Our model relies on a simple decision heuristic,
which is grounded in two well-known behavioral tendencies: probability matching [73]
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and anchoring-and-adjustment [41]. Essentially, we attribute the cause of order variabil-
ity to random point forecasts as well as variable adjustment levels in each period.
We conduct a series of estimations and predictions to validate the forecast anchoring
model both within and across studies. First, with the experimental data set from [13],
we find that our model can predict the mean and variability of order quantities well.
We then compare the predictions with those obtained by the bounded rationality model
of [68], and find that the forecast anchoring model leads to more accurate predictions,
especially the order variances. We also conduct an out-of-sample test where we take
the estimates from the data of Bolton and Katok [13], and use them to predict ordering
decisions in a separate data set from Ockenfels and Selten [56] and validate the fit of our
model. Across the different data sets, we also find a consistent pattern of subjects tend-
ing to anchor heavily on their demand forecast when the product has high profit margin.
This finding suggests that managers need to pay extra attention to the forecast anchor-
ing tendency in the high profit margin products. Moreover, we conduct an individual
heterogeneity analysis and find that the order variability at the individual level is largely
a consequence of random point forecasts. Nevertheless, at the aggregate level, order
variability across periods is due to both random point forecasts and variable adjustment
levels across individual decision makers.
From a managerial standpoint, our work provides upstream firms with the ability to
develop more accurate forecasts of order quantities from downstream parties, resulting
in reduced costs and improved profitability. In addition, by fitting our model to several
experimental data sets, we are able to identify that random point forecasts and variable
adjustment levels are two main causes of excessive order variability in inventory deci-
sions. Thus, to mitigate the adverse effect of excessive order variability, one strategy is
to reframe the problem to induce the decision maker to focus on profit maximization,
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instead of relying on her point forecasts.
We believe that there are several exciting opportunities for future work in this area.
In particular, now that the field has developed a well established set of theories that can
account for the mean ordering behavior in inventory decisions, future work can leverage
this body of work, in conjunction with models such as ours that aim to predict order
variability, and extend them to several settings such as nonperishable products, limited
capacity, multiple products with substitution, or multiple buyers. In addition, the general
notion of formulating simple decision heuristics in a model, and using them to predict
behavior, can be applied to a variety of other operational settings, such as in service
operations or procurement.
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CHAPTER 3
PREDICTING PURCHASE PROPENSITY FROM ONLINE BROWSING
BEHAVIOR
3.1 Introduction
Customers’ series of visit events, such as how frequently and how long they visit the
store, and the items they browse and purchase, can provide useful information to es-
timate demand in advance. Retail stores have traditionally used sales data for making
various operational decisions; however, recent growth of online retail1 and clickstream
tracking technology has provided retailers an extremely rich set of information on cus-
tomers’ pre-purchase browsing behavior, which can help facilitate a firm’s operational
tasks such as demand forecasting, estimation of choice and substitution behavior [10],
and product assortment, promotion, and presentation decisions. Moreover, utilizing the
online clickstream data provides advance demand information well before customer or-
dering, which is a major advantage over classic inventory management models where
the information is provided at the time of ordering [40]. For a comprehensive literature
review of modeling advance demand information in OM, see O¨zer [57].
Although tremendously useful, there are potential challenges to investigate online
customer behavior using clickstream data. First, firms can only capture visits to their
own retailing website and cannot track other websites the consumer is browsing or buy-
ing from. Competing firms do not share data with one another and limit their information
sharing with web analytics firms with specialized/silo-ed contracts. Therefore, it is still
difficult to fully observe consumer behavior with respect to complementary and substi-
1The National Retail Federation (https://nrf.com) expects that online retail will grow 8-12% in 2017,
up to three times higher than the growth rate of the wider industry.
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tute products available in outside market places. Second, online customers often access
the site from different devices. Although the membership and log-in policy mitigate
this issue to a certain extent, it is still nontrivial to fully match the consumer-specific
characteristics, such as demographics, purchasing history, and sensitivity to prices/deals
across different devices. Third, customers can easily keep the web pages on, not paying
attention. If a consumer makes a subsequent click to move to a specific page or go back,
the following URL page is recorded as a part of the clickstream data; however, if the
customer leaves the page upon doing something else, it may seem as if the customer is
still viewing the page. Therefore, it is not obvious whether the customer ended the active
engagement, and we have censored exit time. Fourth, browsing data are not linked with
product attributes and purchases. Since scraping all page information increases the size
of data exponentially, clickstream tracking companies often use URLs to infer on-page
product information.
Acknowledging this, we collaborated with a search marketing analytics company
aiming to build the most useful information from the customers’ clickstream data in on-
line retailing sites. Our research objective is twofold. First, we investigate which aspect
of, and to what extent, the traffic aspect of clickstream data, or the ‘timing of visit,’ can
be used as advance demand information. Second, we further aim to build the demand
estimation model that can improve forecasting by categorizing on-page information and
identifying the customers’ stage of purchase.
In order to describe our data and conduct predictive analysis, we define time-related
variables and terms as follows. First, ‘page’ or ‘page-viewing’ refers to the rendering of
a page in the user’s browser window. Usually, when a customer arrives at the retailers’
website, she views multiple pages. ‘Session’ is defined as a sequence of page viewings
or a period of sustained web browsing and starts with the arrival, or the ‘visit’, to the
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retailing site. If a user has been dormant for more than 60 minutes on one page, we
assume that the session has ended and that the next page viewing marks the beginning
of a new session. Session also ends with the purchase, in which ‘purchase’ is defined
as any page view during which a purchase occurred. Sessions include all of a user’s
page viewings on the retailing website. We call the session that ends with purchase a
‘converting session’ and the customer who made any purchase during the window of
data collection a ‘buyer’. From the perspective of individual consumers, ‘buyers’ may
have multiple non-converting sessions with at least one converting session, whereas
‘non-buyers’ only have non-converting sessions within the data collection period.
It took us several rounds of data revision request to obtain the data set that fits our
research objective, while the analytics firm used their clickstream tracking technologies
across various clients’ websites. The data we obtained through these interactions consist
of three different sets. The first set is collected from August 1, 2013 to July 31, 2014
and includes the customers’ access time to the retailing site and their order information
from three different companies in online retailing. These data contain the buyers’ land-
ing time to the websites and the shopping cart information. The second data set spans
from April 29, 2015 through August 31, 2015, capturing the history of all customer in-
teractions with the sites. Unlike the first data set where only the buyers’ footsteps are
captured, this data set includes the clickstream of all visitors regardless of their purchase
decisions and contains every within-session click, i.e., the sequences and timing of all
pages viewed during the four-month period. The third data set is currently being col-
lected, since May 2017, across multiple retailing sites. This batch of data provides the
most comprehensive and unique information for the estimation of customer preferences
and the heterogeneity across different companies. It includes all of the timing infor-
mation as well as the product-specific information collected from every page viewed.
Therefore, it contains information, such as how long a customer stayed on the search
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page, which products were viewed, and whether the product was purchased. In this
data set, we match the browsed item information displayed on the page view with the
purchased item information and effectively resolve the challenges from the mismatches
between product attributes and URL information; however, since the data collection is
still in process, we use the first two batches of data to meet our first research objective
in this chapter. We explore the impact of the timing of visit and the following sequences
of page views as advance demand information in this chapter.
By analyzing a series of visits to an online store by individual customers over a time
period, we aim to examine online purchasing propensity by identifying its potential pre-
dictors. This study is related to prior research on online customer conversion behavior
and dynamic models of time duration. Although customer browsing behavior linked
with purchasing conversion has been extensively studied by researchers in both opera-
tions and marketing (e.g., [40, 53, 52, 66]), many of these studies focus on one aspect of
clickstream: either within-session or across-session analysis. For example, Montgomery
et al. [53] focuses on the within-session sequence of pages viewed and studies the pur-
chasing behavior given visit conditional on a customer’s arrival. On the other hand,
Moe and Fader [52] address the cumulative effects of visits across-sessions between
purchase conversions. In a recent study, Park and Park [59] utilize different patterns,
considering both within session clicks and across-session visits at the individual level
to study the conversion rate. They also find that repeated purchases increase sales prob-
ability significantly. Our study contributes to the literature in clickstream modeling by
studying the impact of the time duration variables within-session (or shopping dynam-
ics given a visit), combining the effect of cross-session visits by individual consumers
over time (or the past visit history). Moreover, we contribute to the study by Huang and
Van Mieghem [40] by using the clickstream data from multiple firms. We report the
econometric analyses results, using the timestamp data and identifying customer’s visit
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patterns and page-view duration as important sources of predictive information about
their purchase behaviors.
With the first data set, we confirm that the customer conversion rate does not have
a linear relationship with time duration variables. Expected time to purchase, revenue,
basket size, and the types of product vary with the time between the first landing to order
and the number of revisits. Moreover, our finding suggests that the impact of latency2
varies across different retailers. This suggests that it is more important to understand
industry characteristics and build tactics to impact the customer purchase effectively,
rather than focus on minimizing the latency, as online retailers often do.
With the second data set, we conduct predictive analyses at both the user level and
the session level. When we predict whether a customer is likely to buy, we conduct a
user-level analysis, and when we predict whether a session is likely to be a ‘converting
session,’ we conduct a session-level analysis. Our main finding is that customer engage-
ment intensity plays a more significant role in predicting a purchase. We find that rather
than the frequency of different page views, repeated cumulative visits and the longer (but
active) page-view duration increase the conversion rate. We analyze the frequency and
the duration of visits altogether to find that active engagement in a session significantly
predicts the purchase.
We first describe our data characteristics in detail in the next section. We then present
our preliminary findings and propose an econometric model that can provide a founda-
tion to estimate demand utilizing the clickstream data. Since we are still in the process
of collecting the product information on the viewed page and data from multiple other
retailers, we briefly discuss the design of the model but omit the estimation results from
2Latency in the retail sense is defined as the time between two customer events, such as a first and
second purchase. In our study, latency measures the length of the time between the first access (after the
previous session is over) to the purchase.
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the third dataset in this chapter.
3.2 Data Description
The first set of data includes the clickstream from three retailers but captures the con-
verting customers’ paths only due to the data size restriction. This data consists of all
the access times to the retail site, the order time, shopping cart information such as price,
quantity, and item SKU number, and the consumer’s information such as IP address and
location. This data validates the presence of customer heterogeneity across different
industries, and motivates the estimation of time-duration parameters separately across
industries. We collect the data from the three retailing companies with similar sizes:
company S in stationary supplies, F in food retailing, and P in pet supplies. The data
collection period ranges from August 1, 2013 to July 31, 2014. During this one year,
the total number of orders is 8,122 from company S, 18,812 from company F, 37,788
from company P. Total revenue sizes are similar across these retailers: $2.5 million for
company S, $3.3 million for company F, and $2.8 million for company P. The average
revenue per order, price per ordered item, and the time until the order from the first
landing are summarized in Table 3.1.
Comparing the relationship between customer latency and the revenue across dif-
ferent retailers in Table 3.1, note that the relationship is not linear. In company F, for
example, customers spend longer average time until purchase, but the revenue per order
is smaller than company S. Furthermore, we observe that the average number of sessions
before the purchase are 1.8 for company S, 1.7 for company F, and 2.3 for company P.
This shows that average customers of company S or F stays longer in the website until
purchase than company P. In case of company P, the median and mean of latency has
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of the purchase data from three companies
Company S Company F Company P
Revenue per order
Mean $270 $174 $73
Median $137 $132 $47
Price per item
Mean $32 $85 $26
Median $16 $71 $12
Latency∗
Mean 89 hrs 53 hrs 59 hrs
Median 1.2 hrs 2.4 hrs 0.5 hrs
Note: ∗ In our study, latency measures the length of time from the first landing of the page until
purchase.
big gap (in Table 3.1, latency median is 30 minutes and the mean is 59 hours), and the
average number of sessions before the purchase are higher. This implies the presence of
frequent visitors without often making purchases.
We further segment the customers based on their number of repeated sessions until
purchase, and calculate the average quantity and the revenue size of the basket for each
segment. We omit the description of details here; however, we observe that the rev-
enue generation is not linearly trended with the repeated visits. This result implies that
minimizing latency simply does not lead to higher revenue directly, and motivates us to
identify the factors that can predict the purchasing decisions. We also acknowledge the
importance of (1) incorporating abandonment rate by including non-converting sessions,
and (2) breaking down the time-related variables into specific quantitative measures of
engagement in order to accurately predict the purchasing probability.
Therefore, in the second data set, we collect the clickstream data for every visitor in-
cluding within-session clicks from multiple companies. For analysis, we select a retail-
ing company that sells a broad range of products in arts and crafts, such as cross-stitch
and needlework, general craft, knit and crochet, scrapbooking, and stamped stitchery
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product. The company provides products through its factory outlet store and mail cata-
logs, as well as online. The data spans from April 29 through August 31, 2015, capturing
the history of all customer interactions with a website. The sequence and timing of all
pages viewed by both buyers and non-buyers are recorded. Therefore, the data includes
time stamps of entry to website and subsequent clicks, pages viewed, and purchases
made. We observe 198 unique visitors during the data collection periods with 14,621
unique active sessions. Among 198 unique visitors, 96 visitors at least have purchased
once, and we call them ‘buyers’. Among those 96 buyers, 78 buyers revisited, indicat-
ing that 81% of buyers are repeated buyers. Among 14,621 unique active sessions, 657
sessions are the converting sessions.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of the sessions
Converting session paths Non-converting session paths
Mean SD Min Max Median Mean SD Min Max Median
Session length (min) 8.7 15.0 0 199.9 2.8 10.0 16.8 0 249.2 3.6
Page-view duration (sec) 27.7 14.5 0.9 223.6 25.7 24.9 8.8 4.8 56.7 23.8
Page-views per session 19.1 35.2 0 523 7 25.6 81.3 0 5880 9
Total sessions∗ 9.7 12.9 0 81 5 90.7 51.9 3 265 80
Total page-views∗ 72.7 73.8 0 523 53 317.6 621.5 45 5880 204
Purchase history 4.5 4.9 1 32 3 - - - - -
Note: ∗ The numbers are counted until a purchase happens, a customer exits, or the data is censored.
Among the customer engagement measures, Peterson and Carrabis [61] defines the
quantitative indices of clickstream, such as click depth, duration, recency, and loyalty
index. In their definition, click depth represents the number of page views, duration
index is the time spent, and the recency is the rate at which users return to the site over
time, and the loyalty index is the level of long-term interaction the user has with the site
(total frequency of revisits). In this dataset, all measures are defined.
Table 3.2 summarizes the visiting and purchasing dynamics at this retail site (in the
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second data set) during the four months of data collection. In our study, ‘session length’
measures the minutes spent from the visit through the purchase or the exit. Again, we
truncate the session if the page view activity is dormant for more than an hour, and con-
sider it as exit. ‘Page duration’ measures the time spent on the page viewed, ‘page-views
per session’ measures the number of clicks within the session. This summary statistics
show that the average session length and the number of pages viewed of converting ses-
sion paths are not necessarily higher than non-converting session paths. We conduct
econometric analysis to better understand this data in the following section.
3.3 Empirical Analyses
In this section, we empirically examine which aspect of clickstream data is useful to
estimate the purchasing probability using our second data set.
Table 3.3: Length of Active Engagement
Converting sessions Non-converting sessions
Longest idle ≥5min lapse 34% 49%
time per day ≥20min lapse 22% 41%
≤ 1min lapse 61% 65%
Active sessions 1-5min lapse 37% 31%
per day 1-20min laspe 38% 32%
≥30min lapse 1% 2%
We first compare the pattern of customers’ engagement time between the converting
and non-converting sessions. In Table 3.3, we measure the average of dormant (idle)
time and active time per day. First, note that non-converting session paths have a higher
percentage of idle time per day. For example, more than 40% of the time, the non-
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Figure 3.1: CDF of Time Between Clicks
converting sessions stay dormant, while less users (< 22%) in converting sessions stay
dormant on the web for prolonged time. Second, converting sessions have a higher
percentage of 1-5 minute-length or 1-20 minute-length page views than non-converting
sessions. We consider that customers are actively engaging in the page if the time be-
tween the clicks are greater than a few seconds but smaller than a few minutes. Figure
3.1 also shows the cumulative distribution of the between-click time lapse, and shows
that between-click time is more dispersed in case of non-converting session. That is, if
we consider the pages with no click more than an hour (up to a day) as inactive page,
non-converting sessions have higher frequency of dormant sessions. These observations
suggest the higher density of active engagement for converting sessions, and motivates
us to conduct econometric analyses.
Now, we report the Logit regression results. We conduct this analysis in order to test
which time variables can predict the conversion.
First, in order to conduct a user-level and session-level prediction, we express the
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probability of a session ending with conversion as a function of hypothesized within-
session time variables, such as the session length, page duration, and the number of
clicks. We also incorporate the across-session variables, such as past history of purchase
and the total minutes elapsed from the beginning of the very first session up to the current
session. In Table 3.4, we first regress the conversion rate at the user level and the session
level.
Table 3.4: User- and Session- level Logit Regression on the Conversion
User level Session level
Intercept 27.088 ∗∗ -3.801 ∗∗ -3.295 ∗∗
(10.341) (0.092) (0.123)
Session length 0.008 0.007 ∗∗ 0.009 ∗∗
(0.279) (0.002) (0.001)
Page duration -0.527 0.361 ∗∗ 0.618 ∗∗
(4.605) (0.114) (0.126)
Number of clicks -0.017 ∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
Purchase history 0.179 ∗∗
(0.016)
Total sessions -0.009 -0.055 ∗∗
(0.020) (0.005)
Pseudo R2 0.927 0.020 0.189
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
log likelihood -9.93 -1868.95 -1254.19
N 195 12126 11601
Note: ∗∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses.
In the first column of Table 3.4, the dependent variable in the user-level analysis is
the probability of the session belonging to buyer. Note that only the number of clicks
can explain the buyer and non-buyer difference. Here, the number of clicks at user level
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indicates the total number of clicks during the data collection period. Recall that the site-
wise conversion rate is 4.5% (657 converting sessions among 14,621 active sessions).
Moreover, the summary statistics in Table 3.2 suggest that non-converting sessions have
a large number of total clicks over four months. Since there are too many non-converting
sessions which increases the total number of clicks of non-buyers significantly, this pre-
diction result with negative sign on the total number of clicks is understandable. This
result itself does not signal much about the relationship between the time duration vari-
ables. On the other hand, in the session level analysis on the second column of Table 3.4,
the session length and page duration both increases the probability of the session being
the converting session. The dependent variable for these columns is the probability of
the session ends up with conversion. The total number of clicks becomes insignificant
in predicting the converting session, but instead, the longer page-view duration signifi-
cantly predicts the conversion. Page duration measures the minutes between the subse-
quent clicks only within the active sessions. This result is consistent with our previous
descriptive statistics that converting sessions display higher active engagement.
We further observe that there is a large number of repeated buyers in this retailing
site. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the number of repeated buyers. It shows that out
of 96 visitors who have previously purchased, 78 visitors revisited, and among them, 58
visitors revisited, and so on. Past studies (e.g., [52, 40]) support that customers who have
purchased previously are more likely to buy again. We incorporate this cross-session
information into our model, and confirm that number of past purchase has positive effect
on conversion rate.
Next, we conduct Logit analysis at the page-level, in order to investigate the engage-
ment dynamics within the session. In other words, this model can be used to predict
the conversion given the customer’s arrival. In this analysis, the dependent variable
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Figure 3.2: The Number of Repeated Buyers
is the purchase probability at the page view level. Here, the session length measures
the minutes elapsed from the beginning of the current session, page duration measures
the minutes lasted for that specific page, number of clicks measures the within-session
accumulated number counts of the page views, purchase history is the number of past
purchases, total sessions measures the total minutes elapsed from the beginning of the
session up to the most recent page.
We report the results in Table 3.5. The main finding from the page-level analyses
is that within-the session, the longer the page view and the longer lapse time of session
predict the conversion. That is, as long as the session is active, customers who spend
more time to engage in the page views are more likely to make purchasing decision.
Specifically, notice that session length has positive correlation to conversion, whereas
the number of clicks has negative correlation to conversion. Although the results are
omitted here, we found that if we consider only the converting sessions, the number of
clicks is positively associated with conversion. That is, given the session started, the
more the number of pages viewed, the more likely is the conversion happen. On the
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Table 3.5: Click (Page) level Logit Regression on the Conversion
Page level conversion
Intercept -2.936 ∗∗ -3.623 ∗∗ -2.352 ∗∗
(0.010) (0.015) (0.015)
Session length 0.007 ∗∗ 0.006 ∗∗ 0.009 ∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Page duration 0.131 ∗∗ 0.165 ∗∗ 0.143 ∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Number of clicks -0.003 ∗∗ 0.006 ∗∗ -0.003 ∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Purchase history 0.201 ∗∗
(0.003)
Total sessions -0.050 ∗∗
(0.001)
Num click 2 -0.0004 ∗∗
(0.003)
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.102 0.166
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
log likelihood -73444.26 -66720.04 -61998.84
N 340940 340940 340940
Note: ∗∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses.
other hand, the Table 3.5 shows that when we consider the clicks from all sessions, a
higher number of clicks is associated with a lower conversion rate (in column 1 and 3).
However, the column 2 of the table suggest that this result is an artifact of the dominance
of non-converting sessions in our data. In column 2, when we add the quadratic term to
add the curvature in the model, the conversion probability increases and then decreases
with the number of the clicks. We have tried several different configurations of the
model with squared terms, and report the models with good fit only in Table 3.5. Also,
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note that the purchase history significantly explains the conversion rate, supporting that
repeated buyers are more likely to buy again.
3.4 Implication in Operations
Our preliminary analyses suggest that time-related variables can be used for the conver-
sion prediction. We analyze the frequency and the duration of visits altogether to find
that active engagement in a session significantly predicts the purchase. For instance, our
main finding that repeated cumulative visits and the longer active page-views increase
the conversion rate can be directly applied to estimate users’ probability of conversion.
This advance information can be used for targeted marketing or real-time inventory
planning.
First, our Logit analysis shows that within the active session, a five minute increase
of page-view increases the conversion rate by more than 10%. In table 3.4, an increase
in average time spent in page-view is highly correlated with high conversion probability.
An increase of 10% in probability is significant, considering that only about 4% of the
sessions are converting out of all sessions. Therefore, from the retailer’s perspective,
this information is useful to set the threshold of timing of targeted marketing, such as
providing promotions. It can take many different forms, which include advertisements,
free-shipping deals, or price promotions on the specific items in the user’s shopping cart,
but the retailer can select when the best timing for this intervention is.
Second, instead of stocking the inventory with no consideration for future demand,
if the firm can identify the shopping cart information of those sessions with longer active
page views, the firm can be responsive in inventory planning. If we compare sessions
with an average page-view duration of one minute to those of five minutes, our analysis
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result implies that the conversion probability is approximately 40% higher for sessions
with a five minute average page-view duration. Therefore, the firm can use the shopping
cart information from those sessions with longer page-views and focus on forecasting
the demand for that group to reduce demand uncertainty. For an accurate robustness
check of actual operational value, we would need to make assumptions on the inventory
cost parameters and run the simulations.
Third, compared to the users with no purchase history, our result shows that the
users with one purchase history are about 2% more likely to purchase, and the likelihood
increases with further accumulated purchases. By stratifying the user groups with the
number of repeated visits, firms can more efficiently forecast the demand with low cost.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we identify the predictors of purchase propensity given the history of
customer interaction with a website. Our main findings suggest that converting session
paths differ from non-converting session paths: they have higher intensity of successive
engagement. We also find that previous purchases are strong predictors of future pur-
chases. Moreover, utilizing the data from multiple retailing sites that vary in industry
and size, we find that the revenue and the customers’ frequency/duration of visits have
a complex relationship. Not only do the optimal latency and the number of clicks vary
across different firms, but expected time to make purchase, revenue, basket size, and the
types of the product also vary with latency and number of visits.
Because we are still in the process of collecting product information on the viewed
pages from the multiple other retailers, we briefly sketch the idea of our future model.
In order to capture the individual heterogeneity across sessions, as well as online shop-
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ping dynamics within sessions, we can utilize a modified survival model. Let the time
between the subsequent clicks, or the latency, be the random variable T representing the
time duration. Hazard rate is the rate at which this T is completed after duration t, given
that they last until at least t. Since standard hazard rate models are limited to capture the
duration of ‘active’ customer engagement, customer latency can be better modeled if we
incorporate the customer specific covariates. Therefore, we define the state variable as
the individual consumer’s stage towards the purchase or like the concept of a conversion
funnel in Abhishek et al. [1]. We can construct four states: disengaged, active, engaged,
and conversion. Among the disengaged, active, and engaged states, we assume a static
rate of decay or revisit, which can be estimated from data; however, our preliminary
analyses suggest that we need to consider the predictive role of engagement measures
once the session becomes active. When defining the purchase rate, we posit a survival
function conditioned on the individual specific effects, such as the session length, page
duration, number of clicks, and purchase history.
Then, we can build the Markov-chain using the proportional hazard model: we set
the initial hazard rate at the beginning of the session as a function of purchase history and
then incorporate the rest of the within-session time covariates as explanatory variables.
By doing so, we can predict the survival rate at a given time t, which is the timing of
purchase. This advance demand information can reduce inventory cost, since it will
further enhance the operational managers to predict the timing of order.
Our study in this chapter has limitations: it only identifies the potential predictors
of conversion using the data and leaves the hazard model to be built for future work.
We also did not observe (nor estimate) the session ending time. We still have remaining
questions, such as what firms should do to identify non-converting paths and turn them
into converting paths and how customers make decisions on what to buy.
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